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AGAINST PRINCIPLED ANTITRUST 
 
Edward T. Swaine† 
WORK IN PROGRESS: PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE WITHOUT 
PERMISSION.  COMMENTS APPRECIATED. 
 
I. Introduction 
Competition (or, as it is more commonly known among Americans, antitrust1) 
policy is finally on the WTO agenda for the Doha Round, and it’s hard to know what to 
make of that.  For some time the primary question was how the WTO should address the 
intersection of trade and competition policy – practices like monopolization or cartels that 
may impact severely on market access, thereby limiting the benefits of trade 
liberalization.2  Then globalization and the proliferation of national antitrust laws made 
                                                 
† Assistant Professor, Legal Studies Department, The Wharton School, University 
of Pennsylvania.  I would like to thank the organizers of the Sokol Colloquium at the 
University of Virginia Law School for inviting me to participate, as well as the 
participants – including Eleanor Fox, Andrew Guzman, John Setear, and Paul Stephan – 
for helpful comments.  I also benefited from comments by participants in a workshop 
hosted by the Legal Studies Department, and thank its research fund for generous 
support. 
1 I use the terms interchangeably here, though competition policy is sometimes 
meant to connote a broader range of instruments for promoting competitive activity.  See 
William E. Kovacic, Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in Transition 
Economies: The Case of Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 265, 281 (2001) (urging analysis of competition policy in post-socialist economies 
beyond that indicated by an “antitrust-centric” point of view); cf. Wolfgang Pape, Socio-
Cultural Differences and International Competition Law, 5 EUR. L.J. 438, 438-39 (noting 
different meanings); id. at 444 (noting that in bilateral discussions between the United 
States and the European Community, European negotiators agreed that “competition” 
should be interpreted as meaning “antitrust” in the American sense).  
2 The issue did not, however, originate with the WTO, nor is it the only 
international institution so concerned.  See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules 
for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/ CONF/10 (1980), 
revised by U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev.1 (1981), available at 
http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/cpolicy/docs/CPSet/cpset.htm.  
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the creation of an international antitrust regime a subject of great interest in its own 
right.3  Finally, this proto-independence has been threatened by initiatives somehow to 
fold global competition policy into the WTO.  Academics and practitioners came to be 
occupied with whether this was a good idea, and even if it was, whether WTO members 
would ever agree to put it there.4 
These questions have been answered but a little by the decision at Doha to put 
competition policy – or, more accurately, the prior question of whether to negotiate a 
competition policy – on the agenda for the next WTO “round.”5  Its highly contingent 
inclusion means that the WTO’s appropriateness remains at issue in considering how 
                                                 
3 The latest manifestation, the International Competition Network, was launched 
in late 2001, but it is purely voluntary in nature, and shrinks from the task of elaborating 
any multilateral codes or establishing any institutions with independent authority.  For a 
general description, see http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/about.html. 
4 Compare, e.g., Int'l Competition Policy Advisory Comm., U.S. Dep't of Justice 
Final Report 279 (2000) [hereinafter ICPAC Final Report] (advising against recourse to 
WTO as means of addressing private anticompetitive conduct), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ 
icpac/1c.pdf; Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94 
AM. J. INT’L L. 478, 487-94 (2000) (criticizing likely efficacy of WTO in addressing 
global competition needs) with ICPAC Final Report, supra, at Annex 1-A (separate 
statement of Advisory Committee member Eleanor M. Fox) (commending pursuit of 
WTO regulation for antitrust matters bearing on market access); Eleanor M. Fox, 
Competition Law and the Millennium Round, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 665, 670-72 (1999) 
(same). 
5 The Doha Ministerial Declaration formally announced a “work programme” 
rather than a “round” of negotiations, essentially an agreement to negotiate about 
negotiations.  Ministerial Declaration of November 14, 2001, ¶ 23, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 
(Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration] (declaring agreement that 
“negotiations will take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the 
basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of 
negotiations”); see also Steve Charnovitz, The Legal Status of the Doha Declarations, 5 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 207 (2002) (speculating concerning the legal status of the general 
declaration and that concerning TRIPS and public health).  The distinction was important 
to developing countries resisting any commitment to antitrust negotiations.  See Press 
Release, Major Gains for India at Doha Ministerial Conference, Press Information 
Bureau, Government of India, Nov. 15, 2001, 
http://commin.nic.in/doc/nov01_release.htm (“India has also succeeded in warding off 
any commitments for negotiations in the important areas of Investment, Competition 
Policy and Transparency in Government Procurement.  This has been made possible 
through extremely hard bargaining on India's part during the Doha Ministerial 
Conference.”).  
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deep any WTO duties should run.6  Preliminary indications are that any results may be 
relatively insignificant.  Deep divisions remain between members with developed 
antitrust laws (such as the United States and the European Community) and the greater 
number, mainly developing countries, that have little experience with antitrust, 
considerable skepticism about its implications, and a legacy of distrust from previous 
efforts to broaden the range of WTO disciplines.7  Even multilateralism’s staunchest 
advocates concur that apart from the possible exception of an agreement on hard-core 
cartels, any substantive principles will be left to national discretion.8 
                                                 
6 As Professor Jackson has cautioned, the proper question is no longer whether 
antitrust should be handled by the WTO, since to some degree it is already there.  John J. 
Jackson, Afterword: The Linkage Problem – Comments on Five Texts, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 
118, 124 (2002) (“In short, as to competition policy being dealt with by the WTO 
Agreements, there is already a substantial position for the WTO (those who resist are too 
late!)”); see, e.g., Mark A.A. Warner, After Seattle: Is There a Future for Trade and 
Competition Policy Rule-Making?, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 307, 311-13, 334-61 (2000) 
(reviewing WTO competition principles pertaining, particularly, to the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services).  Competition concerns may also be indirectly 
accommodated in the WTO through what are called “non-violation” disputes, under 
which members may complain against official policies having a disproportionate impact 
on imports.  The most significant example, which illustrates as well the procedure’s 
limits, is the Kodak-Fuji dispute.  For analysis, see Patricia Isela Hansen, Antitrust in the 
Global Market: Rethinking "Reasonable Expectations", 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1601 (1999). 
7 For discussions of the political divide between North and South on the 
competition agenda, see, e.g., Simon Pritchard, Tying Up the Competition, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Apr. 26, 2002, at 1; Report from Doha, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Dec. 
1, 2001, at 20.  As made clear below, see infra text accompanying notes __, there are 
important differences of opinion within either camp.  But the papers produced by the 
Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy – the meeting 
reports and the annual reports, as well as the national submissions they reflect – show that 
developing countries have particular misgivings.  See, e.g., Report on the Meeting of the 
Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy of 26-27 
September 2002, ¶ 17, WT/WGTCP/ M/19 (Nov. 15, 2002) (reporting submissions by 
India on the nondiscrimination principles). 
8 See, e.g., Communication from the European Community and its Member States 
to the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, 
WT/WGTCP/W/222, ¶ (Nov. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Communication from the European 
Community (W/222)](disclaiming any “need to aim at a more detailed definition of the 
substantive scope of domestic competition laws,” as “[i]t would be sufficient to envisage 
that such laws would be firmly based on the core principles (and would include a ban on 
hard core cartels”); Report (2001) of the Working Group on the Interaction Between 
Draft 2/11/03 Against Antitrust Principles 4 
If competition is in fact subject only to mild, consensus-based resolution at Doha, 
one of the most promising avenues is to agree on a “principled” approach to antitrust.  
The Doha work program emphasizes clarifying “core principles” that might be applied to 
global competition law, “including transparency, non-discrimination” – meaning, both 
national treatment and most-favored nation (MFN) treatment9 – “and procedural 
fairness.”10  Another principle being discussed, that of special and differential treatment, 
was separately emphasized in the Doha Ministerial Declaration11 and has also been 
                                                                                                                                                 
Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/5, ¶ 34 (Oct. 8, 
2001) [hereinafter Report (2001)] (submitting that, apart from the consideration of hard-
core cartels, “[o]ther aspects of substantive competition law would be left to [national] 
discretion”).  But cf. Report (2002) of the Working Group on the Interaction Between 
Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/6, ¶ 61 (Dec. 9, 
2002) [hereinafter Report (2002)] (reporting view that a rule against hard core cartels 
might be ineffective without provisions addressing other conduct, and that no consensus 
existed even among already established competition authorities as to these other areas of 
concern).  As noted below, however, it is unclear whether developing countries would 
effectively be exempted from a hard-core cartel provision, even were it adopted.  See 
infra text accompanying notes __. 
9 The national treatment principle requires a WTO member to refrain from placing 
other members’ goods, services, or persons at a competitive disadvantage relative to its 
own.  MFN treatment requires a WTO member not to discriminate between other 
members.  Non-discrimination, as used within the Working Group and elsewhere, 
appears intended to encompass both.  See, e.g., Core Principles, Including Transparency, 
Non-Discrimination and Procedural Fairness, Background Note by the Secretariat to the 
Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, 
WT/WGTCP/W/209, at 2, 3, 4 (Sept. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Core Principles]; accord The 
Fundamental WTO Principles of National Treatment, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment 
and Transparency, Background Note by the Secretariat to the Working Group on the 
Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, WT/WGTCP/W/114 (Apr. 14, 1999) 
[hereinafter Fundamental Principles]. 
10 Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 5, ¶ 25 (providing that “[i]n the period 
until the Fifth Session, further work in the Working Group on the Interaction between 
Trade and Competition Policy will focus on,” inter alia, “the clarification of: core 
principles, including transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness . . . ”). 
11 Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 5, ¶ 44 (reaffirming “that provisions 
for special and differential treatment are an integral part of the WTO Agreements,” and 
agreeing with members that “all special and differential treatment provisions shall be 
reviewed with a view to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and 
operational.”); see also id. ¶ 50. 
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prominent in internal deliberations,12 though its centrality to the WTO and to the antitrust 
initiative is less well resolved. 
Adopting core principles is keeping with the emerging orientation of WTO law,13 
and is in many ways an attractive first step.  All the proposed principles (again, with the 
arguable exception of special and differential treatment) seem facially unobjectionable, 
and the reservations expressed to date by WTO members – though they have increased 
even since this article was first sketched – have been relatively mild.  The United States, 
for example, has submitted a litany of questions concerning how the core principles 
might be articulated, but the inference that the project ought not be undertaken at all is 
only implicit.14  Moreover, whatever the limitations that may inhere in the core principles 
(or may be adopted to accommodate skeptics), those principles have at least the whiff of 
law – unlike some other elements of the Doha competition agenda, like capacity building 
and technical assistance.  The core principles offer, in short, one of the few existing 
options for adopting a constraint on the independent development of national competition 
laws.  Other initiatives have endorsed similar principles for global competition law,15 and 
                                                 
12 See Core Principles, supra note 9, ¶¶  3, 17. 
13 See Meinhard Hilf, Power, Rules and Principles – Which Orientation for 
WTO/GATT Law?, (2001) J. INT’L ECON. L. 111, 129-30 (noting “remarkable 
development towards the use of principles in WTO law,” but urging that competing or 
inconsistent principles be balanced by recourse to a separate principle of proportionality). 
14 See Communication from the United States to the Working Group on the 
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, WT/WGTCP/W/219 (Nov. 6, 2002) 
[hereinafter Communication from the United States (W/219)] (addressing procedural 
fairness); Communication from the United States to the Working Group on the 
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, WT/WGTCP/W/218 (Nov. 6, 2002) 
[hereinafter Communication from the United States (W/218)] (addressing transparency 
and non-discrimination). 
15 Most recently, for example, the International Competition Network (ICN) 
adopted the principle that jurisdictions conducting merger review “should not 
discriminate in the application of competition laws and regulations on the basis of 
nationality,” that merger reviews “should be transparent with respect to the policies, 
practices, and procedures involved in the review, the identity of the decision-maker(s), 
the substantive standard of review, and the bases of any adverse enforcement decisions 
on the merits,” and that the merger review should respect various terms designed to 
ensure procedural fairness.  ICN, Merger Notification and Procedures Subgroup, Guiding 
Principles for Merger Notification and Review arts. 2-4 (adopted Sept. 29, 2002), 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/ICN%20NP%20Working%20Group%2
Draft 2/11/03 Against Antitrust Principles 6 
some of the most expert and insightful academic participants in the debate on global 
antitrust have commended their adoption.16 
                                                                                                                                                 
0-%20Guiding%20Principles.pdf.  See also Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
Principles to Enhance Competition and Regulatory Reform (adopted at the Eleventh 
APEC Ministerial Meeting, September 1999) (endorsing principles of non-
discrimination, comprehensiveness, transparency, and accountability in applying 
competition and regulatory principles), 
http://www.oecd.org/doc/M00018000/M00018530.doc; OECD Joint Group on Trade and 
Competition, International Options to Improve the Coherence Between Trade and 
Competition Policies, COM/TD/DAFFE/CLP(99)102/FINAL, at 7 (Feb. 10, 2000) 
(suggesting as examples of “core principles that might be included in any multilateral 
competition rules . . . the WTO principles of non-discrimination, national treatment, and 
transparency”).  The Draft Antitrust Code generated by antitrust scholars in the early 
1990s – known as the Munich Code – also included such provisions, though it failed in 
large part because it tried to do more.   Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATT-
MTO-Plurilateral Trade Agreement (International Antitrust Code Working Group 
Proposed Draft 1993), published and released July 10, 1993, 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 1628 (Aug. 19, 1993) (Special Supp.) [hereinafter Munich Code]; see 
Daniel J. Gifford, The Draft International Antitrust Code Proposed at Munich: Good 
Intentions Gone Awry, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1996). 
16 Professor Eleanor Fox is the most consistent and, as matters have unfolded, far-
seeing of those taking this position.  See, e.g., Fox, Competition Law and the Millennium 
Round, supra note __, at 672 (suggesting that, inter alia, multilateral regulation of 
competition might incorporate principles of non-discrimination as to nationality, 
transparency as to the application of competition and non-competition criteria, and an 
obligation to provide “an accessible litigation system accompanied by the safeguards of 
due process, as recourse for harmed nations and persons (as in TRIPs)”); Eleanor M. Fox, 
International Antitrust: Against Minimum Rules; For Cosmopolitan Principles, 
ANTITRUST BULL. 5, 8-9 (1998) (same); Eleanor M. Fox, Global Problems in a World of 
National Law, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 11 (1999) (describing “[p]rocedural and process 
rules [that] could require transparency, nondiscrimination, and internalizing costs,” and 
that “nations could be obliged to establish a procedural system with due process so that 
aggrieved parties can obtain adjudication of their rights under transparent rules of law”); 
Eleanor M. Fox, Global Markets, National Law, and the Regulation of Business: A View 
From the Top, 75 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 383, 396 (2001) (advocating transparency and non-
discrimination based on nationality).  But she is not alone.  See, e.g., Donald I. Baker et 
al., The Harmonization of International Competition Law Enforcement, in COMPETITION 
POLICY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 441-47 (Leonard Waverman et al. eds., 1997) 
(advocating, inter alia, national treatment and transparency as fundamental principles for 
harmonized antitrust); Ignacio Garcia Bercero & Stefan D. Amarasinha, Moving the 
Trade and Competition Debate Forward, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 481 (2001) (advocating 
WTO agreement based on principles of non-discrimination and transparency); Bernard 
Hoekman, Competition Policy and the Global Trading System, 20 WORLD ECONOMY 383 
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Part II of this paper takes a deliberately contrarian view – namely, that core 
principles are not at all where global competition law at the WTO should begin.  I assume 
that competition law is desirable – though one can have too much of a good thing17 – and 
nothing in this analysis turns on the argument that antitrust must be specially adapted, or 
suspended outright, in order to accommodate the needs of the developing world.18  I also 
hasten to acknowledge that the core principles can, if voluntarily adopted and properly 
leavened on a national level, prove highly desirable for both the adopting nation and the 
WTO as a whole.  But imposing such principles prematurely is another matter, and I try 
to sketch the drawbacks to any such attempt, stressing in particular the (defensible) 
compromises of these core principles even within mature antitrust regimes. 
Part III then addresses proposals at the opposite end of the spectrum, which would 
take advantage of the WTO’s breadth by exchanging real substantive antitrust provisions 
for concessions in other issue areas.  Such proposals rely on a newer, yet fundamental, 
feature of the WTO constitution – namely, the idea of a “single undertaking.”  But 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1997), reprinted in 4 THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 234, 243-44 (Kym Anderson & 
Bernard Hoekman eds., 2002) (citing advantages of incorporating core principles).   For a 
rare exception, see P.J. Lloyd, The Architecture of the WTO, 17 EUROPEAN J. POL. ECON. 
327 (2001) (arguing in favor of non-discrimination generally, but resisting any 
incorporation of antitrust law within the WTO). 
17 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF (rev. ed. 1993) (critiquing pre-modern U.S. antitrust); Andrew T. Guzman, Is 
International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501 (1998) (describing incentives 
for over- and underegulation of international competition). 
18 See Frédéric Jenny, Globalization, Competition and Trade Policy: Issues and 
Challenges, in TOWARDS WTO COMPETITION RULES 3, 15-25 (1999) (detailing, and 
critiquing, arguments that antitrust may be unsuitable for economic or political reasons, 
or unnecessary in light of other laws tending to promote deregulation and free markets).  
For a strikingly cautionary argument to this effect from two FTC economists, see A.E. 
Rodriguez & Malcolm B. Coate, Limits to Antitrust for Reforming Economies, 18 HOUS. 
J. INT’L L. 311, 312 (1996) (concluding that “conclude that antitrust policies adopted in 
reforming economies should be strictly limited in scope”). 
 Such objections might weigh heavily against a robust global antitrust regime, and 
might also have purchase against more incremental steps at building such a regime.  The 
concerns advanced here, in contrast, assume that antitrust accomplishes important 
economic and political goals, and that impairing antitrust regime-building – for example, 
by frustrating its application by sophisticated enforcers, or by retarding the adoption and 
enforcement of such laws by other nations – is presumptively bad.  
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antitrust is ill-suited to take advantage of this mode of bargaining, and again the costs of 
doing so probably outweigh the likely gains.  
If competition policy is disassociated from these principles, what can the Doha 
do?  Part IV breezily concludes by suggesting that two comparatively unprincipled 
approaches – the pursuit of existing bilateral initiative and their voluntary, multilateral 
offshoots, or the negotiation of a plurilateral, antitrust-only accord – offer incremental 
advantages over their more principled counterparts.  Approaches predicated more on the 
assumption of national regimes than on their requirement, I suggest, demand the right 
amount of antitrust virtue from WTO members: that is, no more than the market will 
bear. 
II. The Problem with Core Principles 
A. Non-Discrimination 
The principles of non-discrimination – meaning, again, the combination of MFN 
and national treatment – are fundamental to the operation of the WTO,19 and so it is only 
natural that the WTO members would consider extending them to competition law.  To 
some degree, the question is treated as having been asked and answered.  As participants 
in the Working Group have noted, not only is the non-discrimination norm generally 
applicable within the WTO framework, but it already has some application to 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., GAIL E. EVANS, LAWMAKING UNDER THE TRADE CONSTITUTION 40 
(2000) (identifying national treatment and MFN as “constitutional principles”); Lloyd, 
supra note 16 (arguing that the “internal architecture” of the WTO is based, imperfectly, 
on non-discrimination, and should be reformed to implement fully that objective); John 
H. Jackson, The WTO “Constitution” and Proposed Reforms: Seven “Mantras” 
Revisited, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 67, 72-73 (2001) (identifying MFN as one of seven 
“mantras” central to the WTO); Debra Steger, Afterword: The “Trade and . . . “ 
Conundrum – A Commentary, 96 AM. J. INT’ L. 135, 137, 139 (2002) (arguing that non-
discrimination and affiliated legal principles now predominate over market access and 
reciprocity norms).  Non-discrimination principles are also significant outside the WTO’s 
confines.  Edward A. Laing, Equal Access/Non-Discrimination and Legitimate 
Discrimination in International Economic Law, 14 WIS. INT’L L.J. 246, 270 (1996) 
(“Through the centuries of treaty and municipal law practice, MFN and national 
treatment have been the staples of non-discrimination and the most frequently invoked 
standards of international economic law.”). 
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competition law.  Furthermore, many national laws contain an explicit or implicit non-
discrimination principle.20 
The ubiquity of the non-discrimination principle is of uncertain significance.  On 
the one hand, it is difficult to credit the argument that this demonstrates the need to 
incorporate it as a principle of WTO law.21  On the other hand, though some Working 
Group participants have suggested that further invocation of the principle would be 
redundant and presumably wasteful, that argument is not particularly telling.  The non-
discrimination principles are applied to competition issues involving goods only through 
the WTO’s most general and abstract obligation,22 one that has had little practical import 
                                                 
20 See Core Principles, supra note 9, ¶¶ 23, 26-30, 38-39. 
21 The European Community, however, tried to make that case: 
The importance of non-discrimination - both MFN and 
national treatment - for the multilateral trading system as 
well as national competition laws hardly needs stressing.  It 
is difficult to imagine any situation in which a competition 
law regime would establish a distinction on the basis of the 
nationality of firms and to date discussions in the Working 
Group have shown no such examples.  It is also our 
assessment that most if not all existing domestic 
competition laws do not prescribe discrimination against 
firms on the basis of nationality.  Although significant 
substantive differences remain between various domestic 
competition laws, non-discrimination . . . come[s] across as 
important elements of commonality in these laws. 
Communication from the European Community (W/222), supra note 8, ¶ 11. 
22 Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement provides simply that “[e]ach 
Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative 
procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.”  Understanding 
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, [hereinafter 
WTO Agreement], in Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 1 
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1246.  While this suggests that states must conform all laws 
bearing on the WTO’s concerns, “it leaves open the question what those obligations are.”  
Mark L. Movsesian, Sovereignty, Compliance, and the World Trade Organization: 
Lessons From the History of Supreme Court Review, 20 MICH. J. INTL L. 775, 787 n.86 
(1999) (citations omitted); see also GATT Secretariat, The General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs Uruguay Round Agreements: Report on Environmental Issues, at 59 (Aug. 
1994) (stating that "[t]he requirement that each WTO member ensure the conformity of 
its laws with its obligations under the Uruguay Round Agreements simply reflects the 
Draft 2/11/03 Against Antitrust Principles 10  
even in the trade area.23  The existing authority for matters touching on services is 
broader,24 but again less clear than it might be, and necessarily limited to antitrust matters 
relating somehow to services.  Finally, the notion that many national antitrust regimes 
already reflect such a norm, explicitly or implicitly, is hardly a decisive objection.  For 
members already having an explicit commitment of that kind, an international agreement 
would ossify that commitment, and increase the cost of betraying it; for members having 
an implicit commitment to non-discrimination, a WTO provision would also make that 
commitment explicit, and improve transparency; with respect to members having no 
commitment whatsoever, the benefits would be apparent. 
Or would they?  Even if we assume that adopting non-discrimination principles 
would not be redundant, why would we want them in the first place?  Apart from simply 
asserting that non-discrimination (together with transparency) is “central to the effective 
administration of competition law and policy,”25 the Working Group posited several 
                                                                                                                                                 
basic requirement that governments abide by the obligations to which they have 
agreed.").  
23 A WTO Panel recently ignored the attempted invocation of Article XVI:4 as a 
separate ground for objection to Section 301.  Seung Wha Chang, Taming Unilateralism 
Under the Multilateral Trading System: Unfinished Job in the WTO Panel Ruling on U.S. 
Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 31 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1151, 1189-90 
(2000) (noting, and criticizing, omission); see WTO Panel Report, United States--
Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 19, 1999). 
24 Article II of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) imposes a 
general MFN obligation, subject to national exceptions approved by other members.  
General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. II, WTO Agreement, Annex 1B, The 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts 325 
(GATT Secretariat 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].  The national 
treatment obligation, detailed in Article XVII, obligates a member country to afford 
"treatment no less favourable than it accords to its own [domestic] like services and 
service suppliers,” but permits unilateral exceptions to be detailed by member schedules.  
Id. art. XVII.  The antitrust ambit of the GATS is separately established.  Article VIII 
requires certain limited undertakings with respect to the abuse of a dominant position by 
monopoly suppliers of services, and Article IX imposes a duty to consult and afford 
sympathetic consideration to other complaints regarding anticompetitive conduct in 
services.  In addition, the GATS contains a great number of sector-specific provisions.  
See Warner, supra note 6, at 334-61. 
25 Core Principles, supra note 9, ¶ 18.  The cited antecedent reports, and the 
underlying national submissions, lend little insight into this assertion, save as noted 
below. 
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advantages.  First, adopting a non-discrimination norm for antitrust ensures better 
consistency with the fundamental norms and objectives of the WTO.26  Second, taking 
small, uncontroversial steps toward elaborating an antitrust regime helps build confidence 
and momentum in the broader enterprise, and adopting core principles in particular may 
help establish a climate of mutual trust.27  Third, non-discrimination principles may be a 
bulwark against domestic pressures to favor local companies, and may in the process 
reassure foreign investors and encourage their investment. 28  The symbolic value may be 
the more important, since – perhaps for reasons of politesse – the Working Group’s 
proceedings lack examples of any actual discrimination that would be redressed, and 
there is relatively little evidence of any other official complaints to that effect. 29 
Assuming that pursing these ends is appropriate, the prospect of securing them by 
dint of core principles alone seems dim, both for generic reasons and for reasons peculiar 
to antitrust.  In both cases, the balance of considerations counsels against jump-starting 
antitrust with non-discrimination.30 
                                                 
26 Core Principles, supra note 9, at ¶ 20. 
27 Core Principles, supra note 9, at ¶ 20; see, e.g., Report on the Meeting of the 
Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy of July 5-6, 
2001, ¶ 17, WT/WGTCP/ M/15 (Aug. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Report M/15] (reporting 
submission by EU representatives that adopting core principles would be necessary 
because “in order to facilitate international cooperation on competition policy, it was 
important to create a climate of mutual trust”). 
28 Core Principles, supra note 9, at ¶ 21; see, e.g., Report (2001), supra note 8, at 
¶ 19.  
29 A U.S. submission to the Working Group, for example, submitted that “[o]ur 
experience thus far has that other countries’ antitrust laws and policies generally are non-
discriminatory too, both by design and in practice.”  Communication from the United 
States to the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, 
WT/WGTCP/W/131, at 7 (July 13, 1999); see also OECD Secretariat, Rights of Foreign 
Firms under Competition Laws, COM/DAFFE/CLP/TD(98)23 (Feb. 3, 1998) 
(concluding that OECD members effectively observe national treatment in applying their 
antitrust laws). 
30 As this formulation suggests, matters might be very different were substantive 
terms on the table at the same time, but with the possible exception of hard-core cartels, 
they are not.  See supra text accompanying notes __.  To the extent the agenda changes in 
the future, there is no reason why a non-discrimination principle, or any other core 
principle, could not be adopted then. 
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1. Generic concerns 
The most frequently vetted objection to MFN obligations in international trade is 
the free-rider problem: because a state knows it can secure any benefit extended to 
another party, it has no incentive to make concessions; because every party knows that, 
fewer concessions will be made and fewer mutually beneficial bargains will be made.  A 
state may also be deterred from offering a concession to another state or states if it must 
extend that concession to all states benefiting from MFN status.31  There are 
countervailing considerations, of course.  MFN avoids certain abuses of bargaining 
power, and provides security for countries concerned that their bargains will be overtaken 
by more favorable terms.32  And trade agreements are clearly reached notwithstanding.  
The risk of any disruption appear to turn on the number of parties, their respective 
bargaining power, and the sequence of negotiations. 
National treatment may create analogous bargaining problems, albeit in a more 
informal and asymmetric situation.33  Such obligations may, if credible, serve the 
valuable function of checking domestic favoritism. 34  But they may also check other 
impulses.  For example, if a state is contemplating lowering the threshold for merger 
notifications, in order to satisfy the interests of local companies preferring immediate 
scrutiny to prolonged uncertainty, it may be deterred from doing so by the administrative 
                                                 
31 See Henrik Horn & Petro C. Mavroidis, Economic and Legal Aspects of the 
Most-Favored Nation Clause, 17 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 233, 253 (2001) (discussing model, 
and distinguishing between free-riding problems and “costly concessions”). 
32 For emphases on these considerations as a counterweight to the free rider 
problem, see Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of the Most Favored 
Nation Clause, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 58-63 (Jagdeep S. 
Bhandari & Alan O. Sykes eds., 1997); Horn & Mavroidis, supra note 31, at 255-58 
(2001).  For a more reserved appraisal of the value of MFN in preventing concessions 
from being undermined, see Alan V. Deardorff, Comments on Chapter 1, in ECONOMIC 
DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra, at 80-82. 
33 A national treatment obligation does not formally guarantee that domestic 
parties will be treated as well as foreigners, but it is usually assumed that their political 
accommodation more than suffices.  See, e.g., Baker et al., supra note 16, at 441. 
34 Cf. David W. Leebron, A Game Theoretic Approach to the Regulation of 
Foreign Direct Investment and the Multinational Corporation, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 305, 
335 (1991) (discussing function of national treatment in bilateral investment treatments, 
including significance of credibility). 
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burden of extending the same benefit to foreign entities – and perhaps as a consequence 
shrink from attempting pilot programs.  Local companies, for their part, may be reluctant 
to press for legal reform were the reform’s benefits unavoidably extended to foreign 
entities – perhaps especially where those entities have expended none of the lobbying 
effort – and the admixture of parochialism and free-riding problems may retard any 
efforts at reform.  To be sure, the nondiscriminatory policy is still likely to be the better 
one in both instances, and WTO members may individually be inclined to elect it in any 
event, but imposing the obligation is associated with identifiable costs as well. 
These drawbacks may seem marginal in nature, but they are made more vexing by 
virtue of the underdeveloped state of international antitrust.  First, MFN’s adverse effects 
are surely heightened when that obligation is unaccompanied by any substantive 
concessions.  Unlike the GATT, GATS, or TRIPS agreements (or, for that matter, 
numerous bilateral agreements), in which an MFN obligation was adopted 
simultaneously with a material reduction in barriers to trade, adopting core principles at 
this point would precede any substantive obligations of note.  Under these circumstances, 
the obligation provides very little by way of reassurance to members making concessions 
to one another (because no such concessions have yet been made), while accentuating the 
relative bargaining gains potentially held hostage by free riding.  Imagine, for example, 
that the European Community wished to persuade a developing country to abandon the 
view that aggressive deregulation made adopting an antitrust law unnecessary (having 
already, of course, extracted a commitment that any antitrust law it adopted would 
adhere, hypothetically, to the core principles).35  Many means of applying pressure would 
exist, and it is not self-evident that we would want the Community to have any effective 
means at its disposal.  But the MFN obligation – and the national treatment obligation, 
with which it frequently overlaps in result – would likely deprive it of the ability to make 
favorable treatment under Community law contingent on the country’s adoption of its 
own laws, and it is difficult to perceive the offsetting benefit. 
                                                 
35 See Jenny, supra note 18, at 18-19 (reporting argument that deregulation may 
obviate the need for antitrust); see also supra note __ (noting view submitted by some 
developing countries that no competition laws should actually be required). 
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Such obvious strong-arming is largely hypothetical,36 but more subtle kinds of 
discrimination are established policy.  Some domestic legislation is reciprocity-
oriented.37  Moreover, at least prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hartford Fire,38 
American courts took the state of foreign antitrust law into account in deciding whether 
to exercise jurisdiction over antitrust cases touching on foreign affairs,39 and the federal 
agencies continue to do so as a matter of official policy.40 
                                                 
36 But cf. Raj Bhala, Hegelian Reflections on Unilateral Action in World Trading 
System, 15 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 159, 201-02 (1997) (describing proposed fair trade in 
financial services legislation, under which the United States would be entitled to afford 
national treatment on condition of foreign reciprocation). 
37 In the National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993, for example, the 
United States limited the application of provisions capping recoverable damages for 
claims arising from conduct within the scope of a notified productions joint venture to 
circumstances where the venture’s principal facilities are within the United States, U.S. 
persons control all the joint venture parties, or any foreign persons controlling hail “from 
a country whose law accords antitrust treatment no less favorable to United States 
persons than to such country's domestic persons with respect to participation in joint 
ventures for production.”  15 U.S.C. § 4306.  Those provisions allow considerable 
latitude for foreign laws – it would appear satisfactory, for example, for a country to have 
no antitrust laws at all, so long as they as there is no discrimination against U.S. persons – 
but exert a pressure inconsistent with non-discrimination norms.   
38 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
39 See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3rd Cir. 
1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 
597 (9th Cir. 1976).  But see, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 
731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th 
Cir. 1980); In re Ocean Shipping Antitrust Litigation, 500 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980)Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597 
(9th Cir. 1976).  Cf. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §  
403 (1987) 
40 U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm., Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines 
for International Operations, § 3.2, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)¶ 13,107 (1995), 68 
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) supp. 1 (1995) (explaining that in deciding whether 
to investigate and enforce U.S. antitrust law extraterritorially, the federal agencies will 
consider among other factors the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign 
economic policies; the extent to which the enforcement activities of another country with 
respect to the same persons, including remedies resulting from those activities, may be 
affected; and the effectiveness of foreign enforcement as compared to U.S. enforcement 
action).  The Guidelines further note that “in determining whether to assert jurisdiction to 
investigate or bring an action, or to seek particular remedies in a given case, each Agency 
takes into account whether significant interests of any foreign sovereign would be 
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Second, in contrast to the bulk of the trade regime, the “products” at issue are 
highly differentiated.  Trade law is sometimes distinguished from antitrust law on the 
ground that the former generally addresses governmental measures while the latter 
addresses private conduct.41  But that is not the whole story, even if we put to one side 
state enterprises and regulatory barriers to competition.  At this stage of international 
antitrust’s development, such norms as have developed are principally intergovernmental 
in character.  The United States is obligated under a number of bilateral agreements, for 
example, to cooperate with coordinate antitrust authorities in pursuing matters of interest 
to the parties singly or jointly, and other established antitrust agencies have similar webs 
of agreements.  Under these agreements, coordination is less focused on the nationality of 
the enterprises concerned than with where their conduct has effects. 42 
This is hardly an unusual form of international economic relations, but it 
complicates the application of non-discrimination analysis.  Because such relations rely 
on mutual trust, the parties involved select one another with an eye toward their partners’ 
expertise, regulatory capacity, and integrity.   Indeed, in the International Antitrust 
Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 (IAEAA),43 which authorizes the U.S. antitrust 
agencies to enter into bilateral agreements with foreign governments for mutual 
                                                                                                                                                 
affected,” and recall the agencies' obligation to take into account the legitimate interests 
of foreign nations “in accordance with the recommendations of the OECD and various 
bilateral agreements.” Id. § 3.2 & n.73. 
41 See Lloyd, supra note 16, at 348; Tarullo, supra note 4, at 489. 
42 In the 1991 U.S./E.C. Agreement, for example, the important interests 
triggering notification of the other signatory – and serving as the basis for further 
cooperation – include matters that: (a) are relevant to enforcement activities of the other 
Party; (b) "[i] nvolve anticompetitive activities (other than a merger or acquisition) 
carried out in significant part in the other Party's territory"; (c) involve a merger or 
acquisition in which at least one of the transacting companies or its parents is within the 
other Party's territory; (d) "[i]nvolve conduct believed to have been required, encouraged 
or approved by the other Party"; or (e) "[i] nvolve remedies that would, in significant 
respects, require or prohibit conduct in the other Party's territory."  U.S.-E.C. Agreement 
Regarding the Application of Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, reprinted in 4 Trade 
Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶  13,504 (1998), 1991 O.J. (L 95) 45, corrected at 1995 O.J. (L 131) 
38, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/docs/ec.htm.  For a general description 
of these and other bilateral agreements, see Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global 
Antitrust, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627, 646-60 (2001). 
43 15 U.S.C. § 6201 et seq. (2000). 
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assistance in antitrust matters, Congress required as a precondition that any foreign 
partner have comparable ability to provide assistance, in addition to the specific capacity 
to protect confidential information from disclosure.44  A comprehensive non-
discrimination obligation would, in theory, mean that the United States (and each of its 
partners, and those involved with each other in similar bilateral agreements) would have 
to extent its benefits – for example, providing notification of antitrust enforcement 
activities affecting the important interests of the other party, respect principles of comity 
in deciding whether and how far to enforce, and provide assistance to the enforcement 
activities of the other party (“positive comity”) – to all WTO members, or commit an 
international delict. 
Anticipating this type of problem, the Working Group has posed the question 
whether bilateral cooperation would raise MFN issues were a core principles approach 
pursued.45  Its tentative answer has been that while guidelines might be necessary to 
resolve potential conflict between MFN and bilateral obligations, it would be 
unmanageable to make cooperation obligatory – in other words, that MFN would of 
necessity yield.46  That answer, while perhaps necessary, seems less than satisfactory.  
                                                 
44 Id. § 6211(2)(A)-(C).  In addition to elaborating the protocol for protecting 
against breaches of confidentiality, the Act also requires that in the event of a breach and 
absent adequate assurances that the breach would not occur again, the agreement with the 
foreign government must be terminated.  Id. § 6211(2)(G). 
45 See Core Principles, supra note 9, ¶ 42 (“The concern has been expressed that 
application of the principle of non-discrimination in a multilateral framework on 
competition policy could raise issues if a country cooperates to a greater extent with 
certain countries than with others.  Would this raise MFN issues or would each bilateral 
relationship be treated as separate and distinct?  It has been suggested that guidelines 
might be needed on this matter.”). 
46 Report (2001), supra note 8, ¶ 28 (“The point was also made that due to 
constraints in human capacity, it would not be possible for all requests for cooperation in 
the field of enforcement to be met.  This was a key reason why cooperation under the 
proposed framework should be voluntary.  That is, countries would not be required to 
provide enforcement assistance in all circumstances.  It was noted further, that, in 
principle, this entailed a potential for issues to arise in relation to the MFN principle.  
Guidelines might be needed on this matter.  Notwithstanding this, the proposed 
framework could provide substantial benefits including by enabling competition 
authorities to meet regularly within a solid institutional framework.”); accord Report 
(2002), supra note __, ¶ 21.  The European Community, which like the United States has 
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Even under the bilateral agreements themselves, cooperation is not required.  
Considering forbearance or assistance is, however, and it would appear inconsistent with 
both the core principles of non-discrimination and transparency were some members 
entitled to such consideration and others not. 47 
Equally important, exempting such agreements derogates significantly from the 
non-discrimination principle.  The treatment of customs unions and free trade areas under 
the GATT and other agreements is a source of continuing controversy, and one might 
conclude that the legal limitations on such exemptions are highly ineffective.48  But there, 
at least, the exempted agreements sit atop significant concessions applicable to all 
members, and in theory pursue the complete liberalization of trade that is already 
substantially liberalized.49  In contrast, to date the only species of international antitrust 
involves bilateral relations – or, at most, principles developed in the context of closed 
clubs like the OECD – and applying their mix of “positive” and traditional comity may 
result in more or less antitrust enforcement as between the parties, rather than a one-way 
ratcheting toward liberalization.50  Bilateral antitrust, in other words, may or may not 
                                                                                                                                                 
a number of bilateral and regional cooperation agreements, has stated more firmly that 
such agreements would be exempted from the nondiscrimination principles, relying less 
on capacity limits than on the prospect that WTO members might seek to take advantage 
of bilateral relationships to which they were not entitled.  See Communication from the 
European Community (W/222), supra note 8, ¶ 17. 
47 See Swaine, Local Law of Global Antitrust, supra note 42, at 725-41. 
48 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 165-67, 169-73 (2nd ed. 
1998). 
49 Id. at 165-67; see, e.g., GATT art. XXIV; Understanding on the Interpretation 
of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1161. 
50 Traditional or “negative” comity, put generally, requests that an antitrust 
authority consider the other party's interests in deciding whether to initiate an 
investigation or proceeding, in determining an investigation’s scope, and in determining 
remedies.  Positive comity, the newer and less frequently employed of the two notions, 
involves honoring the request of an antitrust authority for the investigation of 
anticompetitive activities occurring within the requested party’s territory that affect the 
requesting authority's important interests.  For a discussion of the two notions, see OECD 
Committee on Competition Law and Policy (CLP), Making International Markets More 
Efficient Through "Positive Comity" in Competition Law Enforcement ¶  11 
(DAFFE/CLP(99)19) (June 1999). 
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enhance the application of antitrust law to particular activities, and so exempting it may 
prove inconsistent with the assumptions of non-discrimination. 
2. Antitrust considerations 
The above-described difficulties – namely, that of adopting non-discrimination 
principles prior to substantive concessions, and adapting those principles to 
predominantly intergovernmental relations – apply essentially without regard to the 
nature of antitrust.  Other concerns are more topical in nature.  To begin with, it is by no 
means clear how the non-discrimination principles might apply to antitrust problems.  
Unlike subsidies and other issues typically assessed for consistency with national 
treatment, there is relatively little behavior that might be classified as “internal” in 
character, or that treats foreigners distinctly – though antitrust laws do typically show less 
interest in foreign effects,51 and sometimes distinguish between inward-bound and 
                                                 
51 See, e.g., Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA), 15 U.S.C. § 6a 
(providing that the Sherman Act “shall not apply to conduct" involving trade or 
commerce with foreign nations unless “such conduct has a direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect” on trade or commerce in the United States, and “such 
effect gives rise to a claim” under the provisions of the Sherman Act); Hartford Fire Ins. 
Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796-97 n.23 (1993) (explaining that the FTAIA “was 
intended to exempt from the Sherman Act export transactions that did not injure the 
United States economy.”).  This is discriminatory insofar as it reflects less concern for 
foreign consumers – though many would consider international law to have dictated a 
similar, or narrower, jurisdictional scope.  But it does not distinguish in any formal regard 
between would-be plaintiffs on the basis of nationality.  See, e.g., Pfizer v. India, 434 
U.S. 308, 314 (1978) (“The fact that Congress' foremost concern in passing the antitrust 
laws was the protection of Americans does not mean that it intended to deny foreigners a 
remedy when they are injured by antitrust violations.”); id. at 313-20 (holding that, absent 
contrary indications in the Sherman and Clayton Acts, that treble-damages remedies are 
equally available to foreign governments); Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd., 
315 F.3d 338, 341 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (concluding that subject-matter jurisdiction exists 
over suits by foreign plaintiffs who are injured solely by anticompetitive conduct’s 
effects on foreign commerce, so long as the conduct’s effect on U.S. commerce give rise 
to a Sherman Act claim by those plaintiffs or by another private plaintiff); id. at 358-59 
(concluding, in upholding foreign plaintiffs’ standing, that foreign plaintiffs are not less 
appropriate parties to enforce antitrust laws than would be domestic plaintiffs); Kruman 
v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 400 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that the FTAIA allows 
suit by buyers and sellers at foreign auctions whose injuries does not arise from the 
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outward-bound commerce having equivalent effects.52  And such laws still more rarely 
distinguish between one state (and its persons or products) and another based on their 
respective nationalities, unlike tariffs and similar measures subject to a traditional MFN 
analysis.    As a result, applying the non-discrimination principles to antitrust would place 
an uncommon degree of stress on the accurate characterization of corporate nationality, a 
question fraught with difficulty.53   
It is hard to tease from the Working Group’s proceedings any practical examples 
as to how either non-discrimination principle might be applied in practice.  The Group 
has been clearer, however, regarding the categorical exemptions it is contemplating, over 
and above that for bilateral relationships.  For one, it emphasizes that the intent of WTO 
regulation of antitrust is “not to encroach upon the domain of industrial, development or 
social policy,” so that the attendant non-discrimination principles “would have no 
implications for the broader question of the extent to which a market is open to foreign 
                                                                                                                                                 
conduct's harm to domestic commerce, so long as the conduct had “domestic effect 
violat[ing] the substantive provisions of the Sherman Act.").  But compare 15 U.S.C. § 
15(b) (providing that, by virtue of amendments enacted subsequent to Pfizer, that foreign 
governments are generally limited to single damages), with id. § 15a (authorizing United 
States government to recover treble damages), and id. § 15c (authorizing U.S. states to 
recover treble damages in parens patriae suits); cf. Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. 
HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 427 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that foreign and domestic 
plaintiffs alike must show that their claims, and not merely someone else’s, arose from 
the anticompetitive conduct’s effects on U.S. commerce). 
52 See, e.g., Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (2000) (providing limited 
exception from the Sherman Act for associations engaged solely in export trade); Ulrich 
Immenga, Export Cartels and Voluntary Export Restraints Between Trade and 
Competition Policy, in ANTITRUST: A NEW INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDY? 93-94 
(John O. Haley & Hiroshi Iyori eds., 1995) (citing examples from other jurisdictions); 
Spencer W. Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 
343, 397 (1997). (“If there is one fundamental precept among national competition 
systems, it is a rule against cartels. If there is one common exception to that rule, it is the 
export cartel.  Even the most vigorous competition law enforcers accept a cartel affecting 
only foreign markets as either a good thing, a bad thing with statutory authorization, 
something regrettably beyond its jurisdiction, or somebody else's problem”).   
53 For a recent argument regarding the ineffectiveness of prevailing U.S. tests, see 
Linda A. Mabry, Multinational Corporations and U.S. Technology Policy: Rethinking the 
Concept of Corporate Nationality, 87 GEO. L.J. 563 (1999).  An alternative basis for a 
discrimination claim, relating to the nationality of a country seeking traditional or 
positive comity, is address above. 
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investment.”54  This suggests, for example, that foreign acquisitions of domestic 
companies could not be resisted on nationality grounds within antitrust law proper, but 
could be separately restricted by any number of other legal provisions.55   
In addition, the consensus view appears to be that non-discrimination in antitrust 
“would not preclude the enactment of sectoral exceptions, exemptions and exclusions 
from national competition regimes.”56  On its face, this approach would permit a member 
to establish a separate regime for a particular industry or service sector.  It would also 
tolerate procedural variations, such as a requirement that labor representatives be 
permitted to take part in merger review, and the pursuit of potentially divergent 
objectives, like the preservation of small and medium-sized businesses.  Perhaps most 
strikingly, special provisions could perhaps also be made for “joint activities relating to 
export promotion” – that is, the much-criticized export cartels57 -- which not incidentally 
provide the most obvious evidence that antitrust policy is driven by national self-
interest.58  
Such loopholes seem big enough to drive a truck through, but others may be more 
significant.  It would be extraordinarily difficult, most concede, to evaluate whether 
antitrust laws – however broad their purview – are actually being enforced on a 
discriminatory basis.  Enforcement discretion is generally regarded as indispensable to an 
                                                 
54 Core Principles, supra note 9, ¶ 35 (emphasis in original). 
55 Conversely, the domestic acquisition of the same target might be approved, 
notwithstanding graver antitrust concerns, on familiar national champion grounds.  Any 
such decision is likely to be made in the application of more general provisions, however, 
and so implicates the as-applied questions raised by non-discrimination.  See supra text 
accompanying notes __.  
56 Core Principles, supra note 9, ¶ 36. 
57 Id. ¶¶ 36-37; see supra note __ (citing examples).  This is not, of course, free 
from controversy.  See, e.g., Communication from Thailand to the Working Group on the 
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, WT/WGTCP/W/213 Rev. 1, ¶ 2.1 
(Sept. 26, 2002) (describing preservation of export cartels as “unacceptable”). 
58 See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, Externalities in Open Economy Antitrust and their 
Implications for International Competition Policy, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 89, 92-
94 (1999).  As Professor Sykes stresses, though, such cartels are likely the tip of the 
iceberg, given the incentives involved.  Id.; see also infra text accompanying note __ 
(discussing perceived need for a single undertaking approach).  
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antitrust regime.59  Many considerations enter into whether and how enforcement actions 
are pursued, and it is difficult to envision any effective means for evaluating a particular 
matter was favored or disfavored on grounds of nationality.  Comparing fully litigated 
cases would require thoroughgoing review, and where cases are pretermitted without 
conclusive fact-finding or even a complete investigation, something like a de novo 
proceeding would have to be undertaken.  Any review would then have to examine 
differing degrees of culpability, differences in available (and admissible) evidence, 
differing degrees of assistance from the parties, and differing effects within the country in 
question.60  Even where each of two cases involving discrepant nationalities presents a 
convincing basis for intervening, they may be treated differently for reasons having 
nothing to do with nationality.  Antitrust enforcers almost certainly have to husband 
resources in a manner that precludes wholly equitable treatment – such that taking one 
case does not mean that an identical case will be taken – and may desire, for example, to 
protect the government’s long-term litigating position by choosing the best facts on 
which to present a new or controversial theory.61 
No doubt mindful of these and related considerations, the Working Group appears 
already to have dismissed the possibility of applying the non-discrimination principles to 
any as-applied challenges to member antitrust policies, instead focusing solely on explicit 
                                                 
59 See, e.g., Gordon Borrie, The Need for Discretion in the Application of 
Competition Law, in INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION OF COMPETITION LAWS ch. 4.4 
(Chai-Jui Cheng et al. eds., 1995); Ignacio De Leon, The Dilemma of Regulating 
International Competition under the WTO System, 3 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 162, 172 
(1997); Communication from the European Community and its Member States, at 6, 
WT/WGTCP/W/175 (July 26, 2001), 
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDRDocuments/t/WT/WGTCP/W175.DOC; Sir Leon Brittan, 
The Need for a Multilateral Framework of Competition Rules, Address Before the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Conference on Trade 
and Competition (June 29-30, 1999). 
60 W/131, supra note 29, ¶¶ 16, 21. 
61 Cf. Communication from the United States, Administering a Competition Law 
and Policy: The Mechanics of Setting and Pursuing Policy Goals with Finite Resources, 
WT/WGTCP/W/164 (June 26, 2001) (describing the variety of considerations bearing on 
case selection, and the need for discrimination in general). 
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de jure discrimination.62  However commendable that concession, it virtually eliminates 
the advantages of adopting non-discrimination norms.63  Any discriminatory impulse can 
easily be channeled into as-applied discrimination, which not incidentally is less visible 
and thus less likely to prompt retaliation.  Assuming antitrust officials would otherwise 
be legally authorized, or temperamentally predisposed, to discriminate on the basis of 
nationality, it seems unlikely that they would regard continuing to do so as an abuse of 
their considerable prosecutorial discretion.64  And even if the adoption of core principles 
prompts such officials to self-regulate, the diversity of actors entitled to enforce 
                                                 
62 Report (2001), supra note 8, ¶ 27; Core Principles, supra note 9, ¶ 39.  As the 
European Community put it, 
It is important to stress, however, that we are only 
suggesting a binding core principle as regards de jure 
discrimination in the domestic competition law framework, 
i.e. the treatment accorded to firms according to the 
wording of the laws, regulations and guidelines of general 
application.  The main reason for limiting WTO provisions 
to de jure discrimination is that, when transposed to a 
competition context, the concept of de facto discrimination 
could raise complex questions about the enforcement 
policies, priorities and prosecutorial discretion of 
competition authorities, including how competition law is 
being applied to individual cases.   
Communication from the European Community (W/222), supra note 8, ¶ 14; 
accord Communication from Japan to the Working Group on the Interaction between 
Trade and Competition Policy, WT/WGTCP/W/217, at 4 (Sept. 26, 2002) .  I use the 
term as-applied in the text to distinguish it from the way “de facto discrimination” is 
sometimes used in the trade literature – that is, to refer to national laws that have some 
kind of disparate impact on imports.  See Lothar Ehring, De Facto Discrimination in 
WTO Law: National and Most-Favored-Nation Treatment – Or Equal Treatment, Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 12/01 (2001); Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on 
National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” Test, 32 INT’L L. 619 (1998). 
63 See Jenny, supra note 18, at 11 (noting that “[p]rosecutorial discretion is 
another tool used by competition authorities to calibrate their efforts in certain directions 
or regarding certain sectors”). 
64 Cf. De Leon, supra note 59, at 172 (arguing that “by its very nature, discretion 
associated to antitrust enforcement must always be excessive and arbitrary”). 
Draft 2/11/03 Against Antitrust Principles 23  
competition laws in regimes like the United States and the European Community will 
make it difficult to obtain any universal subscription.65  
3. Conclusion 
Given the uncertain nature of the problem being redressed, and the loopholes in 
the norms being proposed, the potential benefits to adopting qualified norms of non-
discrimination seem vanishingly slight.  For many of the same reasons, it must be 
conceded, the potential drawbacks may also seem minimal.  If discrimination is rare (and 
the productive, instrumental use of discrimination still rarer), barring it will not sacrifice 
an important tool in antitrust diplomacy; if the loopholes are plentiful, any legitimate 
ends can probably be pursued regardless.  There would then remain the more abstract 
advantages of rendering antitrust consistent with the WTO constitution, building 
momentum, and building confidence in the integrity of new antitrust enforcers. 
Such claims, I would argue, are precisely where the argument for pursuing non-
discrimination grows weakest.  First, as explored above, antitrust regulation lacks the 
outward-looking (and inward-looking) perspectives generally associated with MFN and 
national treatment obligations, respectively, and furthermore relegates the bulk of 
governmental decision-making to a level of administration ill-suited to international 
control.  It is doubtful, given these characteristics, that any adaptation of non-
discrimination will bear a close resemblance to its use in the trade context, and still less 
likely that it will bring credit to that usage.  
                                                 
65 See infra text accompanying notes __ (discussing role of state and private 
enforcement).  It is difficult to predict whether other actors would be equally inclined to 
discriminate.  Private enforcement actions, which account for the “vast bulk” of actions 
filed in U.S. district courts (WT/WGTCP/W/164, supra note 61, at 9 n.26), do not seem 
especially prone to discriminate on the basis of nationality, and any instinct to do so 
probably pales in comparison to the relative difficulties foreign defendants pose in terms 
of discovery and relief.  The susceptibility of states to political considerations is disputed.  
Compare Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 940-
41 (2001) (describing state enforcers as lacking in resources, prone to capture, and 
essentially incompetent), with Harry First, Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in 
Antitrust Enforcement, 69 G.W.U. L. REV. 1004 (2001) (defending state enforcers against 
criticisms, while reserving question of whether a strong case can be made for state 
enforcement). 
Draft 2/11/03 Against Antitrust Principles 24  
Second, unless it is supposed that any accord on antitrust is a step forward – in the 
same sense that there is no such thing as bad publicity66 – it is hard to see non-
discrimination as a confidence-building measure.  In exempting industrial policy, 
permitting sectoral exceptions, and generally licensing the pursuit of “non-antitrust” 
goals, the Working Group would legitimate a thin version of antitrust that sidesteps any 
genuine commitment to market access.  Whatever one’s feelings toward what is 
sometimes labeled the Chicago approach to antitrust analysis, this hybrid approach seems 
to ignore the most coherent antitrust argument for non-discrimination: as the United 
States put it in supporting the adoption of national treatment, “discriminating against 
parties or firms on any ground, including their nationality, would be fundamentally 
inconsistent” with the overriding ambition of protecting competition, not competitors, 
and eschewing the pursuit of non-antitrust goals.67  What is more, the free-riding risks 
created by non-discrimination may make it difficult to capitalize on any momentum that a 
consensus-oriented declaration of core principles would appear to create, and so frustrate 
any deeper (and more meaningful) integration of global antitrust. 
Finally, because the Working Group understandably would pull back from 
addressing as-applied discrimination, it is unlikely that adopting core principles would 
reassure private parties harboring doubts about the integrity of antitrust enforcers – who 
would, in their own right, lose one formal means of retaliating against non-reciprocal 
treatment.  It may be doubted, indeed, whether establishing nationality as a basis for 
complaint does anything more than reinvigorate an acute sensitivity.  Established antitrust 
regimes are only gradually progressing beyond alleging disparate national treatment,68 
                                                 
66 The pressure to move forward was perceived, though not exactly seconded, by 
Professor Fox.  See Fox, Competition Law and the Millenium Round, supra note __, at 
671 (noting the “consensus that discussions should continue; but discussions must 
normally either move forward or dissipate”). 
67 See Communication W/131, supra note 29, ¶ 13.  For a more skeptical view of 
this credo, see Edward T. Swaine, “Competition, Not Competitors,” Nor Canards: Ways 
of Criticizing the Commission, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. __ (2002) (forthcoming). 
68 See Swaine, Competition, Not Competitors, supra note 67 (noting relative 
absence of discrimination allegations in recent dispute regarding the GE-Honeywell 
merger).  Contrast William E. Kovacic, Transatlantic Turbulence: The Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas Merger and International Competition Policy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 
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and it may be that further incorporating non-discrimination obligations in the WTO’s 
antitrust provisions will cause harmful backsliding,69 without providing us with a 
concrete means of attacking any genuine problems. 
B. Transparency and Procedural Fairness 
Unless one is irrationally fearful of ghosts, it is hard to speak ill of the 
transparency principle.  For one, the idea that antitrust laws and enforcement decisions 
should be made available to the public seems beyond peradventure.  The other reason it is 
hard to criticize, unfortunately, is that it is hard to pin down exactly what else 
transparency might portend.  According to the Working Group, transparency in the WTO 
framework “has at least three dimensions: first, publication; second, uniform, impartial 
and reasonable administration of measures that have an impact on trade; and third, the 
rights of parties to legal proceedings that might lead to the adoption of measures that 
would have an impact on trade, for example the right to be heard.” 70  Other definitions 
have been voiced, both within the WTO context and otherwise,71 but all make it hard to 
observe the WTO’s attempted distinction between transparency and procedural fairness, 
and support the idea that they should be considered together.72 
It should first be noted, however, that transparency in the immediate context 
concerns the transparency of national laws and procedures, not transparency at the WTO 
                                                                                                                                                 
805, 839-52 (2001) (noting, and critically evaluating, claims of economic nationalism in 
the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger).  
69 Cf. Tarullo, supra note 4, at 493-94 (expressing concern that WTO agreement 
might “strain cooperative relationships between competition authorities of different 
countries”). 
70 Core Principles, supra note 9, ¶ 7. 
71 See, e.g., Bo Vesterdorf, Transparency – Not Just a Vogue Word, 22 FORDHAM 
J. INT’L L. 902, 903 (1999) (reckoning, by Judge of the Court of First Instance of the 
European Communities, that transparency involves “(1) the right to a statement of 
reasons for a decision, (2) the right to be heard before a decision is taken, (3) a party's 
right of access to the file, and (4) the public's right of access to information”); Jeffrey 
Waincymer, Transparency of Dispute Settlement Within the World Trade Organization, 
24 MELB. U.L. REV. 797, 802, 804-06 (2000) (noting broad meanings of transparency). 
72 Cf. Core Principles, supra note 9, ¶ 9 (claiming that, in contrast to principles of 
non-discrimination and transparency, “relatively little” discussion in the Working Group 
has been devoted to procedural fairness).  
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itself.  The latter is a significant concern in its own right, particularly as concerns the 
dispute resolution process.  But proposed solutions have proven equally controversial, 
perhaps suggesting that transparency is not so straightforward as it might first appear.73  
To the extent the WTO’s own procedures for articulating and adopting antitrust principles 
are subject to attack for a lack of “legislative” transparency, those concerns may cast a 
pall over its proposal for national commitments – at least to the extent they actually 
require meaningful reform.  
1. Publication 
An obligation to publish remains largely uncontroversial.  The principle problem, 
in fact, is that it is so uncontroversial that international norms are unnecessary.  National 
antitrust regimes do, in fact, make their laws available.74  To the extent omissions 
develop – say, as fledgling antitrust regimes come into being – the abundant incentives 
multinational companies have to root them out, coupled with the commercial interests of 
publishing services and the advent of the internet, mean that that any omissions should be 
short-lived.75 
An obligation to publish decisions implementing that law, or to disclose evidence 
upon which decisions were based, is trickier.  Which decisions are worthy of publication 
seems open to debate.  Virtually every national regime has lacunae, such as the general 
U.S. practice of refraining from disclosing the basis for clearance decisions (in contrast to 
                                                 
73 The controversies involve, for example, the rights of third parties to participate 
in dispute resolution.  Compare G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and 
Nonstate Participation in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 359 
(1996) (arguing for enhanced participation by nonstate parties in WTO dispute 
resolution), and G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: 
An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829 (1995) (same), with 
Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to 
Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295, 300-02 (1996). 
74 Communication from the United States, W/131, supra note 29, ¶ 7 (reporting 
that “[f]rom our understanding, all of these [national antitrust] laws (together with 
accompanying regulations) are published - if not always readily available outside the 
country in question - and the agency charged with enforcing the laws is identified”). 
75 E.g., International Bar Ass’n, Global Competition Forum, 
http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/#' (indexing global antitrust laws). 
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European Commission procedures),76 and decisions to settle almost invariably involve 
less disclosure – though it is not wholly clear why.77  There also seems to be universal 
acknowledgment of the respect owed confidential information, and the need to develop 
safeguards to maintain the confidentiality of any such information,78 but varying national 
schemes have impaired international cooperation thus far.79      
The more profound difficulty with publication transparency, however, has to do 
with the possibility of developing antitrust law through decisions, as against a 
(potentially) more transparent reliance antitrust code.  Though the relative significance of 
judicial decisions and administrative regulations has varied over time,80 the U.S. system 
has consistently been oriented toward the common law-like elaboration of vague 
provisions in the Sherman Act and other antitrust statutes.81  Because this method makes 
it more difficult, on average, to predict the course of the law, and even difficult to 
                                                 
76  No doubt mindful of this difference, the ICN’s new Guiding Principles for 
Merger Notification and Review require transparency as to “the policies, practices, and 
procedures involved in the review, the identity of the decision-maker(s), the substantive 
standard of review, and the bases of any adverse enforcement decisions on the merits.”  
Guiding Principles, supra note 15, art. 2 (emphasis added). 
77 See generally William E. Kovacic, Evaluating Antitrust Experiments: Using Ex 
Post Assessments of Government Enforcement Decisions to Inform Competition Policy, 9 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 843, 847-49 (2001). 
78 Core Principles, supra note 9, ¶ 7. 
79 See, e.g., Baker et al., supra note 16, at 455-59.  
80 Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution By Regulation: The Changing Nature of 
Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OREGON L. REV. 1138 (1999) (emphasizing increasing trend 
toward administrative mechanisms). 
81 See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) 
(“The Sherman Act adopted the term 'restraint of trade' along with its dynamic potential. 
It invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static content that the common law 
had assigned to the term in 1890.”); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 
(1997) (observing that “the general presumption that legislative changes should be left to 
Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act in light of the accepted view that 
Congress ‘expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on 
common-law tradition’”) (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 688)); 
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933) (describing the 
Sherman Act as a “charter of freedom,” with “a generality and adaptability comparable to 
that found ... in constitutional provisions”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 
U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544-47, 551-52 (1983) (contrasting broad enactments such as the 
Sherman Act that invite courts to fashion common law with more precise enactments 
whose gaps should not be filled). 
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determine how the law stands at any given point in time, it may be thought inconsistent 
with any principle of transparency.  Much the same might be said at a more substantive 
level concerning the U.S. “rule of reason,” which has indisputably helped facilitate the 
case-by-case method of the common law approach.82 
This tension hardly proves that the principle of transparency ought give way.  
Many would argue that it is the U.S. system that is flawed,83 and mere inconsistency with 
prevailing U.S. practices, by itself, scarcely renders objectionable (or even suspect) 
contrary international principles.  The point, instead, is that transparency requires 
tradeoffs with other potential values – such as the purported genius of the common law 
method – and may prove more controversial in its application than might otherwise be 
imagined, even for countries that are still making the choice as to the kind of antitrust 
regime they will adopt.84 
A final caveat involves the relationship between transparency and the core 
principle of non-discrimination.  As noted above, the decision not to pursue any 
international regulation of as-applied discrimination is probably well considered.  But if a 
bar on de jure discrimination is pursued, and has any tangible impact, one effect may be 
to drive discrimination underground.  If transparency is highly valued, the net effect may 
be negative: regulated parties would, presumably, prefer to be able to determine by 
surveying a country’s laws whether it is inclined to discriminate, and driving that 
approach from the public view can only make everyone worse off. 
                                                 
82 If for no other reason than by inspiring litigation.  See Frank H. Easterbrook, 
The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 12 (1984) (“Litigation costs are the product of 
vague rules combined with high stakes, and nowhere is that combination more deadly 
than in antitrust litigation under the Rule of Reason”); id. at 12 n.24 (noting difficulties 
vagueness poses for settlement) (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, William S. Landes, & 
Richard A. Posner, Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis, 23 J. L. & ECON. 331, 353-64 (1980)). 
83 See, e.g., Philip Marsden, “Antitrust” at the WTO, ANTITRUST, Fall 1998, at 28 
(noting skepticism of WTO Secretariat regarding application of rule of reason and biases 
of enforcers). 
84  Cf. Report M/15, supra note 27, ¶ 19 (describing submission by India noting 
that, with reference to the adoption of core principles by developing countries, Indian 
experience had been that “not everything could be spelt out in such a law and that some 
matters had to be left for the evolution of jurisprudence over a period of time”). 
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2. Administration 
Transparency and closely allied principles of procedural fairness may also require 
“uniform, impartial and reasonable administration” by national regulators.85  The general 
drift of this obligation is again unobjectionable, but its precise contours raise 
complications.  The most significant complication may concern the standing of 
diversified enforcement systems.  The United States has made a choice, for better or for 
worse, to sacrifice coherence in antitrust enforcement for the sake of comprehensiveness.  
The array of federal, state, and purely private antitrust enforcers86 – not to mention 
federal and state antitrust law – indisputably increases the cost of noncompliance with 
antitrust law.  At the same time, it is the antithesis of “uniform, impartial and reasonable 
administration.”   
Take, for example, the now hoary example of Microsoft.  At the federal level, one 
agency initiated and then ceased enforcement activity, then another agency renewed 
scrutiny and prosecuted Microsoft to the hilt, until an intervening election brought a 
change in administration and the effective abdication of a hard-won remedy.  At the state 
level, attorneys general fluctuated in their support for the federal government’s positions 
– in a fashion correlated not only with changes in the federal position, but also with their 
own political fortunes, sometimes enhanced by campaign assistance from either 
Microsoft or its opponents – and nonparticipating states (at least) retained the right to 
initiate separate proceedings.  Finally, Microsoft’s rivals and consumers of its products 
                                                 
85 See Core Principles, supra note 9, ¶ 9 (describing requirements imposed by 
Article X of the GATT). 
86 Technically speaking, state antitrust authorities invoking federal law also 
litigate in a private capacity.  2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW § 335a, at 286 n.1 (2d ed. 2000).  While it is also possible to address state attorney 
generals as one with their purely private counterparts, e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, The 
Private Attorney General in a Global Age: Public Interests in Private International 
Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 219 (2001), their interests and the risks they pose 
in international matters are also differentiable.  See Swaine, Local Law of Global 
Antitrust, supra note 42, at 750-77 (discussing role of state and private enforcement of 
federal antitrust in international matters). 
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sued it on a variety of antitrust bases arising under federal and state law.87  Were 
Microsoft a foreign company, there can be little doubt that it would have cause to 
complain about the lack of uniformity and reason in its uncoordinated prosecution88 -- 
and it may yet have cause to do so in Europe.89  
More generally, the diversity of antitrust options that has long distinguished the 
United States is increasingly prevalent elsewhere, as evidenced by the European 
Community’s recent decision to substantially decentralize its enforcement authority. 90  
As the European amendments reflect, the fragmentation of antitrust enforcement is not 
purely an historical artifact, but instead may reflect a deliberate decision to increase the 
means for enforcement, and increase local political accountability, at the potential cost of 
uniformity and transparency.91 and it could not but detract from the overall uniformity 
                                                 
87 See, e.g., E. Thomas Sullivan, The Jurisprudence of Antitrust Divestiture: The 
Path Less Traveled, 86 MINN. L. REV. 565, 603 (2002) (explaining that, even if the 
federal government successfully renounces its original quest to break up Microsoft, “the 
case against Microsoft in favor of divestiture could go forward for at least two reasons. 
First, several state attorneys general have stated that they will continue to pursue 
litigation against Microsoft even if the federal government settles its case.  Second . . . 
[the decision in] American Stores empowers private litigants to seek divestiture as a 
remedy for injuries caused by antitrust violations.  Any number of litigants could 
continue to seek the divestiture of Microsoft.”) (internal citations omitted). 
88 For representative criticisms, see Lionel Kestenbaum & James W. Olson, 
Federal Amicus Intervention in Private Antitrust Litigation Raising Issues of 
Extraterritoriality: A Modest Proposal, 16 INT'L L. 587 (1982); Swaine, Local Law of 
Global Antitrust, supra note 42, at 750-77; Diane P. Wood, United States Antitrust Law 
in the Global Market, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 409, 416 (1994); cf. Swaine, Local 
Law of Global Antitrust, supra note 42, at 777-83 (considering pertinence of state 
antitrust law to international matters). 
89 See Paul Meller, European Trade Group Files Suit Over Windows XP, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2003 (describing five-year old investigation by the European 
Commission into Microsoft practices, and new complaint by private group filed near the 
end of the Commission proceedings). 
90 Council Regulation No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of 
the Rules of Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ (L) 1/1 (Jan. 
4, 2003) (available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/dat/2003/l_001/l_00120030104en00010025.pdf). 
91 Diversification may in fact have some stabilizing effects, such as by 
compensating for a change in the political leadership presiding over national antitrust 
enforcers, but they are probably less profound in international matters, given the potential 
for compensating behavior by other national competition authorities.  See Swaine, Local 
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and transparency of antitrust procedures.  The underlying lesson is that the administrative 
virtues being advanced by the Working Group may be at the expense of other, credible 
antitrust values. 
3. Participation 
Finally, transparency and procedural fairness are considered to entail a right to 
participate in the decision-making process, both as a means for checking the authority of 
government officials and as an end in its own right.  The two most problematic 
entailments, involving judicial review92 and third-party rights of initiation and 
participation,93 warrant careful scrutiny. 
Here too, the performance by established antitrust authorities is mixed, and may 
shed some light on its feasibility elsewhere.  With respect to judicial review, for example, 
the European Community has been widely criticized for lacking meaningful judicial 
intervention in merger cases: combining the Commission’s injunctive authority with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Law of Global Antitrust, supra note 42, at 563-64 (noting that stability of U.S. 
enforcement policy “is of diminished benefit in international matters, as the proliferation 
of foreign antitrust authorities, and expanded notions of foreign antitrust jurisdiction, 
make it likely that global practices and transactions will be caught by more than one 
national authority,” and that any self-correction in U.S. enforcement levels “diminishes 
the ability of the U.S. government to ensure external complementarity, such as by 
suspending antitrust enforcement in deference to foreign authorities tendering a request 
for traditional comity”). 
92 See Core Principles, supra note 9, ¶ 9 (noting, in GATT context, emphasis on 
right to judicial review); cf. ICN, Guiding Principles, supra note 15, at art. 4 (“Prior to a 
final adverse decision on the merits, merging parties should be informed of the 
competitive concerns that form the basis for the proposed adverse decision and the 
factual basis upon which such concerns are based, and should have an opportunity to 
express their views in relation to those concerns. Reviewing jurisdictions should provide 
an opportunity for review of such decisions before a separate adjudicative body.”).  
93 See Core Principles, supra note 9, ¶ 13 (noting “the need for firms to have 
access to domestic competition law systems, whether through complaints presented to the 
competition authorities or through the judicial system”); cf. Guiding Principles, supra 
note 15, at art. 4 (“Third parties that believe they would be harmed by potential 
anticompetitive effects of a proposed transaction should be allowed to express their views 
in the course of the merger review process.”); OECD, International Options, supra note 
15, at 7 (suggesting as possible core principle private party “rights to petition a 
competition agency to take action, and/or the right to bring private court cases”). 
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difficulty of obtaining a swift judicial decision leaves the merging parties’ right to 
judicial review far less effective than it might be.  But it is not as though the European 
system was designed to discourage review.  The essential idea, instead, was to act swiftly 
and decisively on the merger, which is to the parties’ benefit, while recognizing that 
obtaining timely judicial intervention of any kind – again, either to enjoin the transaction, 
or as at present, to afford the parties relief – is difficult given the limited capacity of the 
Community’s court system.   
The Commission is aggressively rethinking its system in light of these criticisms, 
and in light of the emerging capacity of the Court of First Instance.94  But some such 
balancing of considerations will likely have to be undertaken by novice antitrust systems 
as well, and it is not clear how simply requiring that judicial review be afforded will help 
them to resolve the inevitable allegations that they have too little.  Even in non-merger 
contexts, it is also possible (if not equally so) to have too much judicial review; such 
intervention may make the law less predictable and transparent, sap the incentives of 
enforcement officials to get it right in the first place, or simply lack expertise.95 
As to the rights of third parties to participate or bring their own actions, it is 
revealing that the same recourse is extolled because it allows the introduction of non-
competition considerations.96  The difficulty of reconciling the rights of third parties with 
the rights of the parties under investigation, as well as the enforcers’ need for assistance 
with their vulnerability to being misdirected, has been a bur in transatlantic antitrust, 
                                                 
94 See Mario Monti, Merger Control in the European Union: A Radical Reform, 
Speech before the International Bar Association Conference on EU Merger Control (Nov. 
7, 2002), 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECH/02/545|
0|RAPID&lg=EN&display= (proposing reforms that would, inter alia, increase flexibility 
concerning the time frame for Commission review and further facilitate judicial review). 
95 Cf. Swaine, Competition, Not Competitors, supra note 67 (discussing similar 
considerations in merger context). 
96 See Report M/15, supra note 27, ¶ 11 (reporting South African submission 
respecting the right for active labor participation in merger assessment as exemplifying 
the fact that “it was possible to apply the same competition principles that would be 
applied anywhere else in the world and, at the same time, advance specific economic 
objectives which were embodied in [the South African Competition] Act and were 
important to the country’s development”). 
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most recently in the controversy concerning the failed GE-Honeywell merger.  U.S. 
criticisms of the Commission’s amenability to competitor submissions in that matter may 
have been simplistic, and turned in no small part on the Commission’s controversial 
economic case for blocking the transaction.97  At the same time, it is difficult to deny the 
possibility that an antitrust agency can be used for misplaced interventionism, rent-
seeking, or even captured outright, particularly in a less mature antitrust regime,98 and 
insisting on third-party access may simply worsen the odds.99  Obliging countries to 
entertain private suits, similarly, may seem appropriate in contexts where the overriding 
focus is on the consumer, but perhaps less so where the prevailing philosophy emphasizes 
goals like the protection of local industry or small and medium-sized enterprises.100  Put 
generally, it may be mistaken to accept the core principles espoused by mature antitrust 
systems while rejecting the substantive principles that make them sustainable. 
Finally, the inter-institutional effects of transparency and procedural fairness must 
be carefully considered.  Because antitrust enforcement is the interface between antitrust 
and its subjects, it is critical to be attuned to procedural niceties in its administration.  But 
in domestic affairs, an antitrust agency is but one of many participants in establishing 
                                                 
97 See, for the last time, Swaine, Competition, Not Competitors, supra note 67, 
passim. 
98 For a nice summary of the concerns, see De Leon, supra note 59, at 171-72.  It 
is noteworthy, though, that many of the relevant studies demonstrating government 
failures in antitrust administration concentrate on the United States.  See, e.g., D. T. 
Armentano, Time to Repeal Antitrust Regulation?, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 311 (1990); 
William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L. 
& ECON. 247 (1985); Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Origins of Antitrust: An Interest-Group 
Perspective, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 73 (1985); Thomas J. DiLorenzo & Jack C. High, 
Antitrust and Competition, Historically Considered, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 423 (1988); Fred 
S. McChesney, Law's Honour Lost: The Plight of Antitrust, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 359 
(1986). 
99 Recognizing the criticisms of its past practices, the Commission is proposing 
that third-party functions be balanced in merger cases by improving the opportunity for 
merging parties to respond.  See Monti, supra note 94.  Alternatively, the risks might be 
ameliorated somewhat by requiring the disclosure of contacts between government 
officials and third parties.  But assuming either practice is generally respected, it would 
be defensible to protect the identity of confidential complainants, thereby ensuring that 
the tension remains. 
100 See supra text accompanying notes __. 
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policy; if core principles limits its effectiveness, it may reduce the agency’s ability to 
promote an antitrust agenda as against other governmental and non-governmental 
participants that may be hostile to that agenda.101  By way of analogy, attempts to 
implement the transparency norm in the European Community have fallen unequally on 
the Commission, and risked both compromising its authority relative to the far less 
transparent Council and impairing its ability to work effectively with the European 
Parliament.102  Just so, it is increasingly difficult to speak of any single agency as 
maintaining responsibility for national competition policy,103 and it is important to avoid 
any such assumption in establishing rules that may handicap its most ardent proponent.  
C. Distending the Core 
As the Working Group has observed, the Doha Ministerial Declaration adverted 
nonexclusively to “core principles, including transparency, non-discrimination and 
procedural fairness,” and that has opened the door to the possibility of incorporating 
special and differential treatment. 104   The basic objective of that principle is to 
incorporate the “concepts of progressivity, flexibility and capacity-building” as “integral 
elements of the proposed multilateral framework.”105  Capacity building simply involves 
the donation of resources, training, education, and technical assistance.106  Flexibility 
mainly formalizes the notion that exemptions or exclusions should be available – or, in 
what is regarded as the same thing, countries should be able “to choose from the menu of 
                                                 
101 One can appreciate the possibilities for this role even within a framework that 
is highly cautious about antitrust.  See, e.g., A.E. Rodriguez & Malcolm B. Coate, 
Competition Policy in Transition Economies: The Role of Competition Advocacy, 23 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 365 (1997). 
102 Juliet Lodge, Transparency and Democratic Legitimacy, 32 J. COMMON MKT. 
STUD. 343, 355-59, 364-66 (1994). 
103 See G. Bruce Doern, The Internalization of Competition Policy, in 
COMPARATIVE COMPETITION POLICY: NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN GLOBAL MARKETS 302, 
318-21 (G. Bruce Doern & Stephanie Wilks eds., 1994) (describing overlapping interests 
of national institutions bearing on the formulation of international competition policy). 
104 Core Principles, supra note 9, ¶ 3 (quoting Ministerial Declaration; emphasis 
added by Working Group); see also id. ¶ 17. 
105 Report (2001), supra note 8, ¶ 31. 
106 Report (2001), supra note 8, at ¶¶ 39-46. 
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prohibitions that could be embodied in competition law those aspects that were relevant 
for its particular economy, in view of its market structure level of development [sic], the 
types of anti-competitive conduct that were prevalent and other characteristics.”107  
Progressivity demands the gradual implementation of any agreed norms – emphasizing, 
theoretically, the priority of adopting antitrust laws, but potentially permitting qualifying 
states (at least) to establish competition laws on a regional basis only,108 and even 
relieving them from any obligation to adopt a competition law within a definite time-
frame.109   
It may be difficult, of course, to properly categorize WTO members for the 
purposes of any such treatment,110 making it difficult to disregard the possibility that 
states choosing not to adopt a competition law may delay for quite some time – perhaps 
having already received support for the endeavor.  But leaving aside the significance of 
such exemptions for the substantive terms of any multilateral agreement, they clearly 
bear upon the viability of the other core principles.  Non-discrimination does not require 
reciprocity, and so does not imply that developing countries need to accord a developed 
country’s enterprises and nationals the same treatment that they themselves are accorded.  
But flexibility and progressivity are nonetheless in tension with non-discrimination.  As a 
representative from India noted in a tentative observation, permitting development-
oriented exclusions means that “it might be perfectly legitimate for a developing country 
competition authority to allow large domestic firms to merge so that they could go some 
way towards competing on more equal terms with multinationals.”  But “[t]he same 
                                                 
107 Report (2001), supra note 8, ¶ 32. 
108 See Communication from the European Community (W/222), supra note 8, ¶ 
8. 
109 Id. at ¶ 8; Report (2001), supra note 8, ¶¶ 32-39; see also Report (2002), supra 
note __, ¶ 61 (reporting view that for many developing country WTO members, even 
establishing a competition law “would be costly and burdensome”). 
110 This problem looms with respect to special and differential treatment in 
general.  See OECD, Joint Group on Trade and Competition, The Role of “Special and 
Differential Treatment” at the Trade, Competition, and Development Interface, 
COM/TC/DAFFE/CLP(2001)21/Final, at 20-21 (Dec. 4, 2001) [hereinafter OECD, 
Special and Differential Treatment] (querying whether distinctions should be drawn 
between categories of developing countries).  To the extent any general categorization is 
simply imported for antitrust purposes, the problem of fit may be worsened. 
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authority might wish to prohibit mergers involving multinationals within their territory on 
the basis that they were already large enough to achieve relevant economies of scale,”111 
and it becomes extremely difficult to say why that distinction is impermissible.  To the 
extent such distinctions are supposed to unfold, and then recede, over in sync with a 
country’s development, they equally confound transparency, and may even be 
inconsistent with the procedural fairness owed the subjects of antitrust law. 
The ultimate question, again, is whether this is worse than the alternatives.  Even 
if countries are not required to adopt competition laws, and each permitted to adapt any 
law adopted to its heart’s content, something is better than nothing.  Establishing core 
principles, furthermore, creates an ideal to which countries may aspire and gradually 
acclimate.112   
As noted previously, one problem is that the meaning of the core principles may 
be compromised for other WTO endeavors.  Though they have never been present in any 
wholly unadulterated form, the core principles are usually accompanied by concessions 
implying something more than a conditional commitment to market reform.  Even if any 
fallout is limited to antitrust, the integrity of genuine non-discrimination, transparency, 
and procedural fairness – and their full aspirational pull – may be sullied.  Finally, to the 
extent that the core principles are taken seriously, they may deter countries otherwise 
inclined to adopt a law.113  As discussed in greater detail below, there may be an 
independent value to letting countries elect antitrust policies more or less on their own, 
but it would in any case be premature to establish an international measure that genuine 
progress might fail. 
   
                                                 
111 See Report M/15, supra note 27, at ¶ 19; see also OECD, Special and 
Differential Treatment, supra note 110, at 17-18 (noting reservations about ease of 
reconciling non-discrimination with special and differential treatment).  
112 Cf. Report (2001), supra note 8, ¶¶38, 45 (addressing concerns that adopting 
core principles in the absence of antitrust laws may be premature). 
113 Report (2001), supra note 8, ¶ 38; Report M/15, supra note 27, ¶ 38. 
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III. The Problem with Meta-Principles 
If the above analysis has purchase, and core principles are resisted – or simply 
regarded as insufficient – perhaps more substantive terms are the answer.  Adopting 
substantive provisions at the same time as core principles would reduce the relative 
significance of any free-riding, provide a material standard by which adherence to core 
principles could be assessed, and more likely result in concrete action against 
anticompetitive behaviors.   
As previously noted, the Working Group has seemed to disavow any such 
ambition, and perhaps with good reason.  Submissions by WTO members reveal very 
different sentiments on the appropriate norms, and history does not augur well for any 
multilateral agreement.  As Professor Guzman has carefully explained, the lack of 
progress is unsurprising.  Different countries have different interests, depending (among 
other things) on their trade patterns, and we should not be surprised if a net importer 
favors antitrust enforcement in excess of the optimum while a net exporter prefers less 
enforcement.114  Though this suggests that national-level regulation will veer between 
excess and laxity, and that net gains might be obtained from international cooperation, it 
will equally be hard to reconcile the two perspectives in any international forum.115  The 
result might explain past failures at multilateralism and continuing features of the 
regulatory landscape.116 
The problem is intractable, Professor Guzman has argued, only if antitrust is 
artificially segregated from other issues, and bargaining made difficult.  If countries 
desiring concessions on antitrust are able to arrange transfer payments of another kind 
(say, by reducing barriers to trade in areas of interest to those making concessions) 
                                                 
114 Assuming the ability to apply antitrust laws extraterritorially, the net importer 
will have due concern for consumer welfare, but tend to slight profits earned through 
efficiency gains to producers; the net exporter, on the other hand, will heed producer 
profitability but slight consumer welfare.  Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 
supra note 17, at 1521.  Without extraterritoriality, international antitrust policy will on 
the whole underregulate, since foreign firms behaving anticompetitively, and exporting, 
cannot be successfully constrained.  Id. at 1523. 
115 Id. at 1524-31. 
116 See id. at 1532-38. 
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agreements on substantive antitrust terms may actually be feasible.117  The WTO, given 
the breadth of the issues it addresses, is a natural environ for this kind of horse-trading,118 
as the TRIPS agreement arguably illustrates.119 
As Professor Guzman recognizes, an antitrust agreement may not be realizable 
until institutional reforms make the WTO a friendlier environment for negotiating and 
                                                 
117 Quite apart from the role concessions may play in making agreement feasible, 
they may ameliorate the transitional hardships that antitrust enforcement could impose on 
transitional economies. 
118 The argument is most fully developed, in general terms applicable to antitrust, 
in Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, U.C. Berkeley Public Law 
Research Paper No. 89 (Aug. 2002), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID321365_code020815630.pdf?abstracti
d=321365; see also Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 17; Andrew 
T. Guzman, Antitrust and International Regulatory Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1142 
(2001).  See also Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, More Power to the WTO?, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
41, 44-45 (2001); Brian Hindley, Competition Law and the WTO: Alternative Structures 
for Agreement, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 
333, 343 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1997) (noting difficulty in reaching 
agreement on antitrust due to “lack of mutually acceptable concessions”); Bernard M. 
Hoekman, Determining the Need for Issue Linkages in Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
43 INT’L ORG. 693 (1989).  As Professor Leebron explains, in addressing generally the 
general motives for linkage, cross-issue bargaining may be necessary not only where 
Pareto-superior agreements are unavailable, but also where a party or parties deems a 
Pareto-superior agreement insufficiently reciprocal.  See David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 
AM. J. INT’L L. 5, 13 (2002). 
119 See generally Andrew T. Guzman, International Antitrust and the WTO: The 
Lesson from Intellectual Property (U.C. Berkeley Working Paper Series No. 2000-20), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID248317_code001107520.pdf?abstracti
d=248317.  Whether TRIPS may be extrapolated to antitrust is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but two banal caveats deserve mention.  First, however unsophisticated many 
countries were with respect to intellectual property, and however ideologically divisive 
those issues may potentially be, TRIPS profited considerably from the drafters’ ability to 
incorporate norms and members from the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO).  See Leebron, supra note 118, at 19-20.  Antitrust has no such precedent.  
Second, an indispensable issue for cross-issue trades – the trust of the parties – may have 
been partly exhausted in the aftermath of TRIPS, as developing countries came to 
recognize the potential costs of recognizing intellectual property rights and to doubt the 
market access commitments by the developed countries.  This is reflected in the emphasis 
on implementation issues at Doha.  Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 5, ¶ 12. 
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implementing non-trade issues.120  His argument depends heavily, however, on 
maintaining what I clumsily term a meta-principle of the WTO – namely, the single 
undertaking method.  With scattered exceptions,121 the Uruguay Round was negotiated 
and the WTO founded on the premise that that agreements are best resolved in a 
multilateral setting requiring participation by all members in all agreements122 – as 
opposed to permitting members to opt in to such agreements as they may individually 
determine, the approach preferred under the Tokyo Round.123  Although the single 
undertaking approach appeared in practice to have significant negative distributional 
consequences for the developing countries,124 and notwithstanding that Doha has been 
billed as the “Development Round,” the same principle was specifically endorsed by the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration and appears to be a fixed component of future 
                                                 
120 For a more skeptical appraisal, see Tarullo, supra note 4, at 489-94 (describing 
institutional features of WTO impairing its ability to address antitrust problems). 
121 At present, there are two “plurilateral” agreements to which WTO members 
can voluntarily subscribe – the Agreement on Civil Aircraft and the Agreement on 
Government Procurement.   Plurilateral Trade Agreements, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO 
Agreement, Annex 4, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/final_e.htm; see 
David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 398, 399 n.8 (1998) (noting that “[t]wo other plurilateral agreements, the 
International Dairy Agreement and the International Bovine Meat Agreement, were 
terminated at the end of 1997”), citing Deletion of the International Dairy Agreement 
from Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement, Decision of Dec. 10, 1997, WTO Doc. WT/L/251 
(Dec. 17, 1997); Deletion of the International Bovine Meat Agreement from Annex 4 of 
the WTO Agreement, Decision of Dec. 10, 1997, WTO Doc. WT/L/252 (Dec. 16, 1997). 
122 See Jackson, The WTO “Constitution”, supra note 19, at 72 (identifying the 
single undertaking concept as a “mantra,” or constitutional principle, of the WTO, and 
indicating reservations). 
123 See JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY, & ALAN O. SYKES JR., LEGAL 
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 302 (3rd ed. 1995) (distinguishing 
“GATT a la carte”). 
124 See Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power?  Consensus-Based 
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339, 356-60 (2002) 
(contrasting Tokyo Round, in which developing countries were able to receive rights 
under the subsidies and anti-dumping codes without assuming their obligations, with the 
“power play” single undertaking strategy adopted by the United States and the EC in the 
Uruguay Round). 
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negotiations.125  Such an approach is arguably essential, too, to persuading otherwise 
unconvinced net exporters to agree to (and abide by) a substantive antitrust code under 
the auspices of the WTO.126  If the single-undertaking approach has not yet resulted in a 
                                                 
125 See Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 5, ¶ 47 (“With the exception of 
the improvements and clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the 
conduct, conclusion and entry into force of the outcome of the negotiations shall be 
treated as parts of a single undertaking. However, agreements reached at an early stage 
may be implemented on a provisional or a definitive basis. Early agreements shall be 
taken into account in assessing the overall balance of the negotiations.”); see Alice 
Enders, The Role of the WTO in Minimum Standards, in CHALLENGES TO THE NEW 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 61, 72 (Pitou van Dijck & Gerrit Faber eds., 1996) 
(arguing that “[t]he experience of the Uruguay Round . . . point[s] to the need for a new 
‘single undertaking’ approach in a future round in order to ensure a global adherence to 
the new agreements”); Friedl Weiss, WTO Dispute Settlement and the New Economic 
Order of WTO Member States, in id. at 77, 79-80 (describing single undertaking approach 
as “the most radical innovation” of the WTO Agreement and an institutional basis for 
future agreements). 
126 See Guzman, Global Governance, supra note 118, at 19-28; see also id. at 35-39 
(describing scope of WTO, as opposed to stand-alone agreements, as creating a 
disincentive to exit).  At an earlier juncture, the European Commission apparently 
espoused a plurilateral, stand-alone antitrust agreement from which developing countries 
could opt out after the close of negotiations – raising essentially the same risks posed by 
the Tokyo Round agreements.  See OECD, Special and Differential Treatment, supra 
note 110, at 19-20 (citing EU Commission Paper: State of Play and Strategy for the New 
WTO Round – Note for the Attention of the 133 Committee (Dec. 13, 2000)).  
Developing countries, too, found fault.  See UNCTAD, Closer Multilateral Cooperation 
on Competition Policy: The Development Dimension – Consolidated Report on Issues 
Discussed during the Panama, Tunis, Hong Kong and Odessa Regional Post-Doha 
Seminars on Competition Policy held between 21 March and 26 April 2002, ¶ 48 (May 
15, 2002), http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/cpolicy/gvaJuly/docs/DohaFinal-en.pdf 
(describing “danger of plurilateral negotiations” as being “that later, developing countries 
having opted out would face an agreement which did not take into account their needs, 
and which was even less development-friendly. There was also concern that plurilateral 
agreements might eventually become part of a ’single undertaking’ or package, as was 
the case for a number of agreements at the end of the Uruguay Round.”). 
Professor Guzman also emphasizes the importance of dispute resolution 
procedures to increasing the credibility of commitments.  Id. at 28-35.  Though 
examining the application of the WTO’s dispute resolution process is beyond the scope 
of this paper, it should be noted that the net effect of the Uruguay Round may actually 
have been to diminish the sanction for noncompliance.  See Warren F. Schwartz & Alan 
O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the 
WTO/GATT System (John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 143 (2nd ser.) 
2002).  It is unclear whether entrusting competition to the WTO would increase or 
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substantive antitrust agenda, perhaps it is because the WTO is not yet appropriately 
designed to negotiate non-trade agreements, or perhaps because its members have not yet 
grasped the point. 127  
But some alternative explanations also come to mind.  One possibility is that the 
model’s diagnosis of the antitrust impasse is somehow flawed.  Professor Guzman’s 
model supposes that developed countries, as net exporters of goods in imperfectly 
competitive markets, will be the parties opposing international antitrust, while developing 
countries – as net importers of such goods, and exporters of more homogenous products – 
will favor the adoption of stricter policies.128  In practice, however, while the United 
States has been reluctant to endorse any substantive multilateral antitrust policy,129 the 
developing countries have been no more enthusiastic about the competition agenda at 
Doha, perhaps in part because they perceive the compromised solution as inequitable.130  
                                                                                                                                                 
decrease the sum of tools available to states desiring to enforce compliance with 
preferred methods or outcomes. 
127 It is disconcerting, however, that the idea of linking non-trade issues has 
encountered such resistance in the past, if it really promises Pareto-superior solutions.  
See Hoekman, supra note 118, at 696 & n.8, 697 (noting procedural constraints at the 
beginning of the Uruguay Round on cross-sectoral negotiation).  At the very least, it 
complicates any public choice analysis of negotiations.  Compare id. at 697 (asserting 
domestic political constraints on cross-issue linkage) with Guzman, Is International 
Antitrust Possible?, supra note 17, at 1529-31 (providing public choice perspective on 
why antitrust-only negotiations might fail). 
128 See, e.g., Guzman, International Antitrust and the WTO, supra note __, at 16; 
Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 17, at 1536-37. 
129 U.S. representatives, for example, have expressed fear that substantive WTO 
negotiations might result in standards pitched at the “lowest common denominator.”  Joel 
I. Klein, A Note of Caution with Respect to a WTO Agenda on Competition Policy, 
Remarks to the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Nov. 18, 1996) [hereinafter 
Klein, A Note of Caution], http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ public/speeches/jikspch.htm.  Some 
experts interpret that as expressing concern that EU, rather than U.S., standards might be 
adopted, suggesting that an ideological divide – one tending, on average, to reflect greater 
European interventionism on competition grounds – may be dampening U.S. enthusiasm.  
It may, on the other hand, reflect the estimation that a lax standard full of exemptions, per 
expressed developing country preferences, may be adopted, which it might oppose for 
reasons having little to do with U.S.-EU differences. 
130 For example, developing countries have voiced objection to the relative 
inattention to cross-border trade, as in the likely exemption for export cartels, and 
resulting emphasis on essentially domestic reform – an imbalance benefiting the 
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Its advocates have been countries like Japan, Norway, and (most significantly) the EU 
and its member states, suggesting further that developed countries are scarcely of one 
view.131  For whatever reason, the model’s predictions do not entirely pan out.  
It remains the case, though, that a division of opinion exists, and it might be 
possible to imagine the kind of trade that a single undertaking regime can facilitate – say, 
one in which the developed countries (driven by EU preferences) bargain for the 
agreement of developing countries to heightened international antitrust standards.  A 
more systemic difficulty, however, is that determining the transfer price is difficult, if not 
impossible, in the case of antitrust. 132  Any such estimates are imprecise, of course, but 
several features of international antitrust make the problem more significant.  The critical 
question from a developed country’s point of view (again, by way of generalization) will 
be to determine the effect of a WTO pact on a developing country’s antitrust 
enforcement.  But the acknowledged importance of preserving the discretion of antitrust 
enforcers, and the difficulty of controlling for other actors (including the courts and 
private complainants invigorated by any commitment to transparency and procedural 
fairness), make it difficult to enforce compliance and even to determine whether a 
country is transgressing – let alone to anticipate in advance any effect a pact might 
have.133  Furthermore, because countries have adopted antitrust laws in waves, due to 
perceived internal benefits, it will be hard even to reckon whether a WTO pact is strictly 
necessary to make formal institutional changes.  Conversely, from the developing country 
point of view, estimating the transfer price will also be challenging.  Discussions within 
the Working Group suggest that many countries have only the most rudimentary grasp of 
                                                                                                                                                 
developed countries, resulting in preferences consistent with what Professor Guzman 
would have predicted under the circumstances.  See Report (2002), supra note __, ¶ 27; 
see, e.g., Communication from Thailand (W/213 Rev. 1), supra note __, ¶¶ 1.2, 2.1, 2.2. 
131 See supra note __. 
132 I put aside here any general problems concerning the estimation of transfer 
prices for non-trade matters, which may be soluble.  See generally Hoekman, supra note 
118. 
133 Professor Guzman specifically notes enforcement as to a barrier to antitrust-
only agreements, see Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 17, at 
1540-41, but there is no reason to think it would be any less disabling for achieving a 
linked agreement.  
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what antitrust law entails, let alone any more precise understanding regarding its net costs 
and benefits over time. 
If deriving initial negotiating positions would prove difficult, the negotiations 
themselves may be even more so – in part due to ideological differences that Professor 
Guzman understandably does not try to incorporate in his model.134  At the core of the 
U.S. position in international negotiations has been the premise that, contrary to a simple 
exporter/importer model, an antitrust regimen strengthens domestic firms for 
international competition – a line of thinking drawn from American business schools,135 
but not one confined to America.136  Many developing countries disagree, and the 
inability of the negotiating parties to agree on whether antitrust “pays for itself” is likely 
to frustrate negotiations to a substantial degree.137  The entire dialogue, in fact, may be 
counterproductive.  Kenneth Abbott has suggested elsewhere that the “obsessive quid pro 
quo thinking” born of tariff negotiations makes it difficult to reach agreement even on 
issues, like corruption, where a remedy may be mutually beneficial138 – and one may 
fairly wonder whether that mentality is reinforced with each attempt at bargaining in that 
mode. 
                                                 
134 They are mentioned, that is, as extrinsic factors that would merely buttress the 
conclusion that negotiating “pure” antitrust agreements is difficult, see Guzman, Is 
International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 17, at 1509, 1511-12, & 1539, but do not 
resurface in his discussion of linked agreements.  Id. at 1545-46.  
135 See, e.g., A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust at the Turn of the Century, Address 
Before the Fourth International Symposium on Competition Policy, Seoul, Korea, at 4 
(Dec. 7, 1999), http:// www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/5232.htm, quoting MICHAEL E. 
PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 662 (1990) (“Few roles of 
government are more important to the upgrading of an economy than ensuring vigorous 
domestic rivalry. . . .  Firms that do not have to compete at home rarely succeed abroad”). 
136 OECD, Special and Differential Treatment, supra note 110, at 17-18 (noting 
submission by Japan that “Japan’s experience indicates that international competitiveness 
can eventually be further strengthened by increasing competition among domestic 
companies, rather than regulating competition through exemptions”). 
137 Similar problems attend negotiations concerning conventional barriers to trade, 
of course, since it may be argued that reducing such barriers confers benefits on a 
nation’s consumers that overwhelm the harm they may do to its producers.  But the 
behavior of most countries demonstrates that they share a skepticism toward that appeal, 
arguably to a greater degree than with antitrust. 
138 See Kenneth W. Abbott, Rule-Making in the WTO: Lessons from the Case of 
Bribery and Corruption, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 275, 293 (2001). 
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The disagreement also relates to a distinct disadvantage of bartering for antitrust.  
The strength of antitrust law in those countries that have adopted it turns to an 
underappreciated degree, in my view, on the degree to which they have elected it and 
cultivated it over time.  Putting to one side questions about how extensively antitrust 
must be adapted to local circumstances,139 and the success of legal transplants in 
general,140 the strongest regimes, the United States141 and the European Community,142 
can basically be said to have come into their own.  Other cases, such as Germany and 
Japan, are obviously more complicated, though they tend to substantiate the point. 143  It is 
                                                 
139 See generally Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International 
Harmonization of Law: Lessons from Antitrust, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 557 (1994).  William 
Kovacic has written extensively on this point.  See Kovacic, supra note 1; see also 
William E. Kovacic, The Competition Policy Entrepreneur and Law Reform in Formerly 
Communist and Socialist Countries, 11 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 436 (1996); William 
E. Kovacic, Designing and Implementing Competition and Consumer Protection Reforms 
in Transitional Economies: Perspectives from Mongolia, Nepal, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, 
44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197 (1995); William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy, Economic 
Development, and the Transition to Free Markets in the Third World: The Case of 
Zimbabwe, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 253 (1991). 
140 For a relatively optimistic view, see ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN 
APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 12-14 (2d ed. 1993), 
141 See Lawrence A. Sullivan & Wolfgang Fikentscher, On the Growth of the 
Antitrust Idea, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 197, 199-208 (1998); Waller, Neo-Realism, 
supra note 139, at 574-81. 
142 See DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY 
EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS 431 (1998) (summarizing argument that 
“competition law in Europe is fundamentally European”) (emphasis in original). 
143 The standard account is that the United States forced Germany to adopt 
antitrust laws after World War II, but German antitrust in fact had distinctive pre-war 
roots that influenced its implementation and application of a much broader successor 
scheme.  See David J. Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo- 
Liberalism, Competition Law and the "New" Europe, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 25, 62-67 
(1994); Sullivan & Fikentscher, supra note 141, at 208-26.  Japan, too, was forced to 
some degree to adopt antitrust laws after World War II, though there are complications to 
that account.  See Harry First, Antitrust in Japan: The Original Intent, 9 PAC. RIM. L. & 
POL’Y J. 1 (2000) (arguing that, contrary to popular belief, Japanese government 
negotiators played a significant role in adapting American antitrust model to national 
political and economic goals).  It would appear, however, that the principal reason why 
antitrust “took” in Germany and not in Japan had a great deal to do with the prior 
acceptance of its premises in national legal and economic thought, which allowed 
Germany (and not, until much later, Japan) to recognize that decartelization was not 
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difficult, admittedly, to isolate time or autonomy as a variable in those nations’ 
accomplishments, and no easier to claim that a country’s acquiescence in a trade-related 
obligation is involuntary in any strict sense.144  But intuition suggests that paying for the 
consent of countries that would not, by hypothesis,145 otherwise agree to accept antitrust 
law is less likely to produce self-enforcing and effective national regimes, and more 
likely to place stress on the enforcement machinery of the WTO.146  The bottom line is 
                                                                                                                                                 
merely an attempt by the Allies to contain its national economic power.  See generally 
JOHN O. HALEY, ANTITRUST IN GERMANY AND JAPAN: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS, 1947-
1998 (2001). 
The simpler story, perhaps, is that Japan precisely illustrates the problems with 
imposing antitrust: while its officials now extol antitrust as an unalloyed good, its 
application of those laws in international matters has frequently been called into question, 
and there is room even to doubt the effectiveness of even their most recent reforms – 
which were motivated, again, largely to appease foreign critics.  See James D. Fry, Note, 
Struggling to Teethe: Japan’s Antitrust Enforcement Regime, 32 LAW & POL’Y INT’L 
BUS. 825 (2001).  
144 Compare Julie Mertus, Human Rights: Group Defamation, Freedom of 
Expression and the Law of Nations: What International and Domestic Laws Can Teach 
the United States, by Thomas David Jones, 21 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 581, 581-82 (1999) 
(book review) (arguing generally that “the legal transplant process is generally marked by 
some form of coercion, . . . states that adapt their laws to conform with the laws of 
politically powerful states are rewarded . . . while those that do not are penalized”) 
(citations omitted) with Jonathan B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue: 
Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
295 (2001) (arguing that “whatever the possibilities for the use of power to make law, 
trans-echelon legal borrowing [from national law] into international treaty law is 
decidedly less likely to be coercive (and hence more likely to be Pareto-efficient) than is 
transnational legal borrowing”).  Like Professor Wiener, I assume the relevant level of 
analysis is at the state level, though that plainly makes the comparison with other kinds of 
coerced transplantation hazardous. 
145 It may be that developing country governments are merely posturing in order 
to extract a better bargain, or in order to make more credible their claim to local elites 
that they are compelled (albeit by a bargain to which they ultimately agreed) to enforce 
antitrust law against them.  In either case, though, it would be harder to claim any unique 
advantages from a multilateral, single-undertaking form of agreement. 
146 The issue of externally imposed transplants, and their relative efficacy, 
receives relatively little attention in the comparative law literature, but nothing in that 
literature belies that a transplant’s success turns in part on the balance of the forces of 
change and the forces of resistance – which in the case of externally imposed transplants 
may be directly correlated with one another.  Cf. Alan Watson, Comparative Law and 
Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313, 332-34 (1978) (describing stability of law as 
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that persuading countries to accept antitrust in exchange for other commitments may 
easily neglect their need to internalize antitrust norms,147 and hold little advantage 
relative to the more explicitly coercive techniques of reciprocity and discrimination.  
Forcing antitrust, furthermore, may make it more likely that the agencies applying it will 
use its tools to protect competitors rather than promote competition.148 
Subjecting antitrust to the single undertaking principle may therefore fall far short 
of any optimal policy.149  It seems probable that that no such agreement would be reached 
in the foreseeable future.  Even if one were, the transfer price could easily be too high or 
too low, meaning that the optimal competition law we might idealize could be offset by 
inappropriate concessions of some other kind (though it is possible that, were they to 
come in the form of reduced barriers to trade, even an exorbitant transfer price might 
improve welfare).  Finally, in a world where the population of politically feasible 
concessions is limited, involving antitrust law in WTO-style bargaining may mean that 
fewer chits are available for future bargaining over non-trade issues – like labor law, or 
                                                                                                                                                 
determined, in part, by strength of “pressure forces” and “opposition” forces).   It would 
appear, however, that the European Union may have effectively managed that balance in 
imposing its antitrust laws on the Central European nations eager to accede.  Eleanor M. 
Fox, The Central European Nations and the EU Waiting Room – Why Must the Central 
European Nations Adopt the Competition Law of the European Union?, 7 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 351 (1997). 
147 Cf. Steven P. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal 
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 432, 531 (2001) (citing “key insight from international 
relations theorists and others that internalization is critical to successful implementation 
of international norms, whether in human rights or other areas of the law”). 
148 For a similar assertion, see William H. Page, Antitrust Review of Mergers in 
Transition Economies: A Comment, With Some Lessons from Brazil, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1113, 1117 (1998) (“The dangers of perverse use of antitrust are multiplied if antitrust is 
imposed on countries that do not willingly adopt it. Donor organizations like the World 
Bank have imposed requirements for implementation of antitrust laws as conditions for 
loans.  Countries that grudgingly acquiesce in these requirements are not likely to carry 
out an effective antitrust enforcement policy.”). 
149 It is important to recall that stringency of this objective.  National antitrust 
regulation, with extraterritoriality, can reduce a great deal of anticompetitive behavior; 
international cooperation can be achieved, particularly in the absence of 
extraterritoriality.  See Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 17, at 
1528-29.  The problem is that neither is likely to maximize world welfare, though how 
much either would fall short would be hard to quantify. 
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human rights – that might be equally deserving of emphasis (even as the cross-issue style 
of antitrust bargaining, as noted previously, sets a precedent for such negotiations).    If 
antitrust is really to be linked to other topics in international trade law, the potential gains 
should be compared to those realizable for other potential agenda items, and will likely 
be found wanting. 
 
IV. Conclusion: Conditioning Principles 
There are limits, happily enough, to the case against principled antitrust.  For 
example, were the WTO members were to reach consensus on a significant provision 
concerning hard-core cartels, there would be less room to object to marrying that 
substantive term with principles of non-discrimination, transparency, and fair procedures 
in its application.  If an agreement of genuine substance is being put in place, there are 
sound arguments for accompanying it with core principles that tend, in general, to 
improve global welfare and consistency with the rest of the WTO, at least if the details 
can be worked out. 
Failing that, some unprincipled alternatives deserve consideration.  One is to stick 
with the status quo, dynamically speaking – that is, the combination of creeping 
extraterritoriality, the progressive forging of “soft” bilateral cooperative agreements, and 
modest multilateralism of organizations such as the OECD and the new International 
Competition Network, all of which cater to more established national antitrust regimes.  
The argument for the status quo has been made elsewhere both in summary fashion150 
and at ponderous length,151 but two features deserve brief mention here.   
First, while the bilateral relationships that have been forged are limited in their 
scope and ambition, and cover a minute fraction of the WTO members, they create what 
                                                 
150 Former Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein was known to respond to calls 
for a WTO antitrust agenda by saying, “If it ain't broke, don't fix it."  See, e.g., Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann, Competition-Oriented Reforms of the WTO World Trade System-
Proposals and Policy Options, in TOWARDS WTO COMPETITION RULES: KEY ISSUES AND 
COMMENTS ON THE WTO REPORT (1998) ON TRADE AND COMPETITION 43, 62 (Roger 
Zach ed., 1999) (noting, and reacting to, Klein’s perspective). 
151 See Swaine, Local Law of Global Antitrust, supra note 42. 
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should be regarded as local international law – intergovernmental obligations for 
procedural coordination that have the potential to expand beyond their immediate cast of 
countries and bind antitrust authorities to coordinate their activities with their peers.152  
The International Competition Network provides indirect evidence of this potential.153  
The arguments for establishing core principles, or in the alternative relying on meta-
principles, are largely premised on the perception that there is nothing to lose, but the 
potential for local international law may inspire greater caution.  For example, to the 
extent that a principled approach poses risks to existing relationships – by calling into 
question the compatibility of those relationships with the non-discrimination principles, 
or reviving national discrimination as a rhetorical claim – their costs may outweigh their 
advantages. 
Second, it is perhaps noteworthy that these nascent principles emerged from what 
can only be characterized as an unprincipled beginning – the U.S. assertion of the ability 
to enforce its antitrust laws extraterritorially, coupled with its subsequent practice of 
moderating that jurisdiction through comity (again, through standards of its own design).  
One might go further, and urge the unmoderated assertion of authority as a spur to 
genuine international cooperation.154  But for immediate purposes, it suffices to note that 
                                                 
152 See id. at 725-41.  As I stress, this obligation is “very elementary”: 
Nations exercising antitrust authority over foreign parties 
or relating to activities taking place in foreign nations are to 
consider moderating the exercise of their authority in order 
to accommodate that nation's legitimate interests, including 
by considering the prospect that the other nation might 
redress any harm by exercising its own antitrust 
jurisdiction.  Nations should also give full consideration to 
requests that they investigate and regulate restrictive 
business practices having adverse effects on other nations. 
Finally, in order to facilitate these ends, antitrust  
authorities should provide notice and share information to 
the extent consistent with their domestic laws and interests. 
Id. at 738.  
153 See supra note __. 
154 See William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An 
Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101, 152-67 (1998); Thomas 
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beginning in any unprincipled fashion does not always result in chaos, and there are 
countless examples in international relations where principled beginnings actually do. 
A different tack would be to shed the semblance of WTO multilateralism and opt 
instead for a plurilateral, stand-alone agreement governing antitrust.  This has been tried 
before, without success, and so the disadvantages are easily stated.155  But so are the 
advantages.  Rather than manufacturing consent, such an approach would be the most 
likely to elicit able and committed signatories.  Reciprocity could form an important part 
of the agreement’s negotiation and terms, with implications both for developing and 
developed countries.156  Participation might also be made contingent on possessing an 
established antitrust framework permitting, for example, mutual assistance on matters of 
concern to another antitrust authority, or coordination of remedies in merger cases.  
Finally, because competition authorities having domestic effect might be presupposed, 
the first substantive areas for international agreement might be those pertaining to market 
access – areas thematically linked to and belonging within the WTO, but too easily 
                                                                                                                                                 
W. Dunfee & Aryeh S. Friedman, The Extra-Territorial Application of United States 
Antitrust Laws: A Proposal for an Interim Solution, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 883 (1984). 
155 In 1993, the so-called Munich group of experts proposed a draft International 
Antitrust Code, which they envisioned as a plurilateral GATT agreement.  Draft 
International Antitrust Code as a GATT-MTO-Plurilateral Trade Agreement 
(International Antitrust Code Working Group Proposed Draft 1993) (July 10, 1993), 
reprinted in 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628 (Aug. 19, 1993) (Special 
Supp.).  But the proposal did not go very far, in part because it was uncommonly 
ambitious in its scope.  See id. at S-7 through S-9 (reporting alternative, minimal 
approach); Daniel J. Gifford, The Draft International Antitrust Code Proposed at 
Munich: Good Intentions Gone Awry, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1997) (criticizing 
Munich proposal). 
156 With respect to the United States, for example, foreign signatories might 
demand a certain level of commitments by state enforcers, as with the Government 
Procurement Agreement.  Matthew Schaefer, Searching for Pareto Gains in the 
Relationship Between Free Trade and Federalism: Revisiting the NAFTA, Eyeing the 
FTAA, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 441, 472-73 (1997) (describing bargaining between the United 
States and Canada concerning the sufficiency of its state commitments); Matthew 
Schaefer, Twenty-First Century Trade Negotiations, the US Constitution, and the 
Elimination of US State-Level Protectionism, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 71, 78 (1999) (same). 
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excluded in negotiations with countries reluctant to create antitrust solely as a vehicle to 
facilitate foreign entry.157 
Independent of their service within the plurilateral framework, such an approach 
would stand a better chance of founding antitrust authorities with integrity.  For reasons 
previously stated, adopting a multilateral WTO agreement consisting of core principles, 
replete with exceptions to accommodate the most reluctant members, may inadvertently 
give rise to antitrust agencies prone to behaving in an unprincipled fashion – at least 
where the purposes of antitrust are more narrowly understood.  As the U.S. and European 
experiences have demonstrated, even relatively sophisticated, secure, and well funded 
agencies can enforce rules that in hindsight diminish consumer welfare – such as by 
impairing competition-enhancing vertical arrangements, blocking mergers that promise 
real efficiency gains, or imposing overly stringent limitations on productive horizontal 
relationships. 
A plurilateral arrangement would moderate those tendencies in part by permitting 
the more graduated, careful, and voluntaristic creation of national antitrust regimes.  But 
it would also encourage a more dedicated application of side-payments should anyone 
                                                 
157 Contrast, e.g., Communication from the European Community (W/222), supra 
note __, ¶ 18: 
Non-discrimination - in relation to a competition agreement 
- has no bearing on the question of whether foreign firms 
have access to a particular market.  This depends on a range 
of trade and investment factors outside the scope and ambit 
of a WTO competition agreement. In other words, by 
making the operation of the domestic market more efficient 
and more transparent, an effective domestic competition 
policy enables traders and investors to fully benefit from 
market access concessions the importing or host country 
may already have made, but does not imply any greater 
market access concessions.  As a matter of fact, effective 
application of competition policy actually helps importing 
or host countries to avoid some of the perceived risks that 
are sometimes associated with market access concessions 
or FDI, that is, of foreign firms or investors with market 
power disproportionate to that of domestic firms, abusing 
such power. 
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choose to accelerate the process.158  Rather than paying for antitrust through the reduction 
of barriers to trade, a plurilateral regime might involve genuine, concessionary capacity 
building and technical assistance for developing countries desirous of agreement but 
without the means to fulfill any terms.  Institutions, scholarship has repeatedly 
established, are a condition precedent to meaningful economic reform. 159  Literally 
buying foreign antitrust laws and officials may seem the antithesis of a principled 
strategy, but it perhaps holds greater promise for a principled future. 
   
 
                                                 
158 Cf. Leebron, supra note 118, at 14 (noting that “in the negotiations over the 
environment, developed countries agreed to establish a fund for developing countries to 
pay for certain measures of environmental protection, rather than simply agreeing to 
make an unrestricted side payment,” and that “in the Uruguay Round trade negotiations, 
developed countries agreed to adjust their food assistance to compensate for the adverse 
effects on the food-importing developing countries of the restriction on agricultural 
export subsidies”). 
159 See De Leon, supra note 59, at 171-72; Kovacic, Institutional Foundations, 
supra note 1. 
